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This paper  is an  attempt  to broaden  economic  discourse  by importing  insights  into  human
behavior  not  just  from  psychology,  but  also  from  sociology  and  anthropology.  Whereas  in
standard economics  the  concept  of  the  decision-maker  is  the  rational  actor, and  in  early
work  in  behavioral  economics  it is  the quasi-rational  actor  inﬂuenced  by  the  context  of the
moment  of decision,  in some  recent  work  in  behavioral  economics,  the  decision-maker
could  be called  the  enculturated  actor. This  actor’s  preferences,  perception,  and  cognition
are subject  to  two deep  social  inﬂuences:  (a)  the  social contexts  to which  he  has  become
exposed  and,  especially,  accustomed;  and  (b)  the  cultural  mental  models—including  cat-
egories,  identities,  narratives,  and  worldviews—that  he  uses  to  process  information.  The
paper  traces  how  these  factors  shape  behavior  through  the  endogenous  determination  of
preferences and the  lenses  through  which  individuals  see  the  world—their  perception  and
interpretation  of  situations.  The  paper  offers  a tentative  taxonomy  of the  social  determi-
nants  of  behavior  and  describes  the  results  of  controlled  and  natural  experiments  that only
a broader  view  of these  determinants  can  plausibly  explain.  The  perspective  suggests  more
realistic models  of human  behavior  for explaining  outcomes  and  designing  policies.
© 2016  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. Introduction
Arrow (1994) reminded us that the standard economic theory of individual and ﬁrm behavior was actually a theory
n which social determinants—factors not attached to particular individuals but instead to social groups—were crucial. But
tandard economics considers only the social determinants of choice sets: prices and the rules of the game. The social
eterminants of decision-making are left out, since the core theory of standard economics assumes rational actors with
table, coherent, and autonomous preferences, which are certainly not affected by social context.
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Recent research in behavioral economics has broadened our understanding of how individuals make choices. Exploring the
psychological inﬂuences on behavior, this research has shown that the context of the moment of decision inﬂuences choices
even when the context should be transparently irrelevant to the decision.1 For example, the context can make prescriptive
norms against theft focal in attention and thereby reduce theft, or make a descriptive norm of frequent stealing focal and
thereby increase it (Cialdini et al., 2006). Peers in a college (among men, a randomly assigned roommate) and peers in
a workplace can lead an individual to change his behavior to match theirs more closely (Kremer and Levy, 2008; Herbst
and Mas, 2015). The social factors in these particular examples—the cues or role models that make a norm or behavior
salient—would not affect behavior under standard economic theory. Insight into these social determinants of behavior
can be used to shape it: individuals can be nudged to take one action or another (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). The Obama
administration has actually used these ideas as instruments of policy (Executive Ofﬁce of the President, 2015).
This paper discusses another strand of behavioral economics. This strand recognizes durable social inﬂuences on pre-
ferences and cognition. Past social experiences and past social structures can result in sustained ways of conceptualizing
a situation and, hence, sustained beliefs and social outcomes—for example, mistrust, a sharp gender division of labor, or a
pattern of aggressive responses to disputes or slights that seem trivial in origin.2 Sociology and psychology have introduced
mental models (or schemas) into their analyses as the tools that individuals use to process information and conceptualize.
Cultural mental models include concepts, categories, social identities, narratives, and worldviews.3 They “shape the way we
attend to, interpret, remember, and respond emotionally to the information we  encounter and possess” (DiMaggio, 1997, p.
274).
An individual may  have in his mind multiple mental models that he can draw upon to interpret the situation he is in, and
they may  be inconsistent in content and in implications for behavior (D’Andrade, 1995; Swidler, 2001). What determines
which one is selected? As DiMaggio (1997, p. 275) notes, “selection is guided by cultural cues available in the environment.”
Thus the social variables that behavioral economics introduces into decision-making—the social context of the moment of
decision and mental models—interact.
The analysis described so far is simply an elaboration of the standard behavioral economics model, explaining in greater
depth, for instance, how certain “nudges” might work. This paper argues that the social context not only primes individuals,
eliciting one kind of behavior or another, but that in a fundamental sense it shapes them—how they think and what they
want. Social context creates the set of mental models upon which individuals can draw, and affects the circumstances that
prime alternative mental models.
This durable shaping of individuals is the distinction between the work on which this paper focuses and earlier work in
behavioral economics whose central interest was reasoning biases that were typically thought of as universal and hard-wired.
It is not just that the social context of the moment of decision inﬂuences behavior by making certain norms, role models,
or reference points, or other associations focal in attention. In a sense, prolonged (and sometimes even brief) exposure to a
given social context shapes who people are.
Parents know this: they worry about who their children associate with. Parents send them to schools where they will be
inculcated with the values that the parents respect. But while the inﬂuence of social context on preferences and, thus, the
endogeneity of preferences, seem patently obvious, the implications for economic behavior have, for the most part, been
ignored.
The following story illustrates the issue. We  can imagine that people are born with many different kinds of actors inside
them. Consider an individual, Fred, and call two of the potential actors inside him A and B. Let A be a scrupulously honest
person and B be a less scrupulously honest person. An insight of behavioral economics is that Fred can be induced to act
more or less scrupulously by changing the cues to which he is exposed. We  say that Fred is primed to be A or B. At any given
moment, it may  be easier to prime Fred to be A than B.
But now having gone to work for an international bank in a period when social norms against dishonesty towards clients
are lax, the set of stimuli that elicit Fred to behave dishonestly expands. This changes who  Fred is. After being embedded in
a new context for a long time, an individual can become more B than A.
Racism is an example of a behavior that no one is born with but that is learned (Kinzler and Spelke, 2011). A society
can create a mental model of racial hierarchy and represent it as describing the world objectively. Children growing up
in that world are exposed to that mental model, and it almost surely becomes one of their mental models as an adult.4It is a culturally created mental model. A segregated and unequal society will constantly prime it. An individual brought
up in a racist society will make certain decisions and certain choices. This culturally created mental model changes the
1 See Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Moscovici (1985), and Ariely et al. (2003).
2 These examples are discussed in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Alesina et al. (2013)Cohen et al. (1996) and Brooks et al. (2015). Early work that
emphasizes the biased processing of information using cultural beliefs (cultural mental models) includes Akerlof (1989), North (1990), and Denzau and
North  (1994).
3 Not all mental models are cultural. Some are idiosyncratic representations that a single individual created; for example, the mnemonic for a lock
combination. Other mental models, such as basic object categorization, are innate. Humans may also be innately attuned to the category of “dangerous
animal” (Bregman, 1934). But the mental models of interest in the social sciences are cultural.
4 The set of possible mental models is inﬁnite. There are an inﬁnite number of ways to think and in the case of a given individual, most have zero weight.
The  set of possible mental models is not well-deﬁned.
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ndividual’s preferences, cognition, and behavior from what they would have been had the individual never been exposed
o the segregated and unequal society.
As we discuss in this paper, culture is the focus of a rapidly growing strand of work in economics.5 Since individual
references/behavior (say, in confronting a particular choice set) are inﬂuenced by the social context, including the actions
nd beliefs of those around the person, culture itself is endogenous. In some cases, economists can “solve” for equilibrium
ultures, that is, cultures that give rise to behaviors that are self-sustaining—or would be in the absence of any exogenous
vents.
Because the environment shapes human cognition and behavior so deeply, habits of thought and behavior can be culturally
ransmitted across generations (e.g. Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Alesina et al., 2013). The result is that there can be societal
igidities; it may  be difﬁcult to change culture.
At the same time, we  will see that historical situations and events can also have path-dependent effects (Herlihy and
ohn, 1997; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). But there is no teleology. As Darwin pointed out, there are evolutionary dead
nds. Even taking account of history, there may  be multiple (social) equilibria, and one of them may  Pareto-dominate others.6
Social identities and norms are an essential part of what it means to be human. However, some social identities and norms
an emerge that marginalize certain groups or are good for almost nobody—for example, the norm in traditional India of
ati (widow-burning), female genital mutilation, and child marriage. In cases in which norms lead to obviously perverse
utcomes, interventions that shift the mental models and norms can be empowering, at least for certain groups.
At one time, economists could relegate the issues we are discussing here to sociologists—concepts like social identity
ight be important for explaining social interactions, and perhaps even political choices, but not for economic behavior. Just
s economists have had to come to terms with the fact that individuals act in ways that are markedly different from those
redicted by the rational actor model,  economists will have to come to terms with the fact that preferences and cognition are
haped by those surrounding us, and that these social interactions may  be as important determinants of economic outcomes
s the variables upon which economists have traditionally focused. The social inﬂuences on the nature of the individual are
o longer beyond the boundaries of economics. Instead, social determinants of preferences and cognition are increasingly
emonstrated in empirical work on individual choice and societal change. The broader perspective expands the explanatory
ower of economics and the accuracy of economic predictions. Most importantly, this perspective identiﬁes sources of
ocietal rigidity that the standard model takes no account of, and identiﬁes new instruments that can inﬂuence behavior
nd long-run social change.
.1. Going beyond the Robinson Crusoe economy
One of the paradigms within standard economics has been the Robinson Crusoe economy. Understanding the limitations
f that paradigm enhances understanding of the difference between the line of research described here and other strands
f work in conventional and behavioral economics.
A central feature of the Robinson Crusoe economy is the absence of social interaction. Therefore none of the issues that
e have discussed here can arise in a Crusoe economy, but many of the insights of behavioral economics do apply. Work
n behavioral economics demonstrates that much of our behavior is not consistent with rationality: Robinson Crusoe, living
lone on his island, may  suffer from framing effects, conﬁrmatory bias, anchoring,  and the multitude of other reasoning errors
hat behavioral economics has identiﬁed (Kahneman, 2003, 2011).
Interestingly, the standard economic narrative of Robinson Crusoe ignores an important part of Daniel Defoe’s parable.
ven on this isolated island, there is a society; Crusoe is accompanied by his man Friday. Defoe’s story tells us much about
heir social interactions. Although Friday’s capabilities are better suited than Crusoe’s to the economic challenges in the island
nvironment on which the men  have landed, their hierarchical relationship persists. Standard economic theory could not
asily account for this. But models of sociology and anthropology would ﬁnd no puzzle: Friday and Crusoe have naturalized
he status they each held before arriving on the island. It has become part of their identities. Friday would perhaps feel as
ncomfortable giving orders as Crusoe would feel receiving them. The society they came from has shaped their preferences.
.2. A schematic representationThe three columns in Table 1 set out three types of economic literature: (1) standard economics with rational actors,who
ave stable, exogenous preferences; (2) behavioral economics with quasi-rational actors,who make seemingly inconsistent
5 Research on culture has also created new subﬁelds outside of economics—cultural psychology (e.g., Bruner, 1990; Fiske et al., 1998; Heine, 2012)
nd  cognitive sociology (e.g., DiMaggio, 1997; Zerubavel, 1997). The new ﬁeld of cultural neuroscience examines the impact of experience and culture
n  brain development (see Section 5.9 below). A deﬁnition of culture in these subﬁelds emphasizes that individuals rely on cultural mental models to
rocess  information. Culture is deﬁned as the interaction between (i) mental models (schemas), which make some ideas more accessible than others, and
ii)  cues in the environment that activate particular mental models: “In schematic cognition we ﬁnd the mechanisms by which culture shapes and biases
hought” (DiMaggio, 1997, p. 269). But much work in economics on culture does not emphasize the human dependence on cultural mental models to
rocess  information; a recent review is Alesina and Giuliano (2015).
6 This is a general property of evolutionary models; see, e.g. Hoff and Stiglitz (2001). But as the analysis below shows, standard welfare analyses may be
f  limited relevance when preferences are endogenous. What is clear is that there are signiﬁcant distributive consequences of alternative equilibria.
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Table  1
Standard economics and two  strands of behavioral economics.
Standard economics Behavioral economics
Strand one
Behavioral economics
Strand two
The conception of agents Rational actors
•  Stable, autonomous
(exogenous) preferences
Quasi-rational actors
• Consistent choices under “slow thinking”
•  Sometimes seemingly inconsistent
choices under “fast thinking”
Enculturated actors
• Endogenous preferences, perception, and
cognition, including “fast” and “slow”
thinking, shaped by social constructs
(cultural mental models)
Disciplinary foundations • Rational choice axioms • Psychology (cognitive and social)
•  Empirical observations of individual
choices
• Psychology (including cultural),
sociology, and anthropology
• Empirical observations of individual
choices
The  drivers of behavior • Prices
• Rules of the game
•  Incentives, as in column 1
• Context in the moment of decision, e.g.,
the way  in which choices are presented
• Incentives and context, as in column 2
•  Experience and exposure, which
•  Create mental models, e.g., Categories
  • Concepts
 • Social identities
 • Worldviews
 • Narratives
•  And affect what primes certain behaviors
choices; and (3) behavioral economics with enculturated actors7 who have endogenous preferences, perception, and
cognition.
Note that columns (1) and (2) have in common the assumption of consistent choices under “slow thinking,” but column
(2) introduces the idea of “fast thinking,” which can lead to seemingly inconsistent choices. Individuals in making most
of their decisions use an automatic, intuitive, and associative mode of thinking (fast thinking), rather than a deliberate,
reﬂective, and effortful mode (slow thinking). Fast thinking generally draws on only a small part of the relevant information.
By affecting the salience and accessibility of information, the context of the moment of decision affects behavior.
Columns (2) and (3) have in common that people may  be irrational, but column (3) introduces the idea that people process
information using cultural mental models.  Experience and exposure create those mental models. In making a particular
decision, an individual may  be able to draw on one of several mental models that differ in their implications for action.
Hence, even deliberate thinking can lead to irrational behavior, at least as conventionally deﬁned.8
Table 2 gives a 2-by-2 taxonomy of inﬂuences in behavioral economics. The two  columns distinguish momentary from
durable effects. On the basis of this distinction, we deﬁne two  strands of behavioral economics. The two rows of the table
distinguish non-social from social inﬂuences.
Amos Tversky in discussion with one of the authors 40 years ago, said that his work was motivated by his discovery
of a durable, non-social inﬂuence on perception (see Axelrod 1973, p. 226-227). People use the haze through which they
see an object as a cue to its distance. This is practical, since a distant object is seen through more haze than a close object.
Individuals in temperate climates learn how to judge distance from their experience in their environment. But in a hot desert,
haze evaporates quickly, and the cue will be misleading. The heuristic that these individual use is wrong. The heuristic (the
mental model) can, of course, be changed, but it takes time, particularly since people may not be aware of the techniques
they use to judge distance.
Since there are non-social inﬂuences on preferences, perception, and cognition, behavioral economics would be relevant
to an individual in isolation on an island. Depending on the situation he faced, Robinson Crusoe might think fast or slow. He
would be susceptible to both momentary and durable inﬂuences on what he wants and how he thinks.
The four cells of Table 2 have fuzzy boundaries. One can create new mental models quite easily in some cases, and the
effects can sometimes be surprisingly enduring. However,But as the psychologists Markus and Kitayama (2010) emphasize,
sustained change requires that changes in individual psychological tendencies be reﬂected in interactions, institutions,
and ideas. Unless the mental models are also reﬂected in everyday social interactions and in the policies and practices of
institutions, the new mental models are unlikely to be long-lasting for most people. Change can begin at the individual
level, but to bring about change in society, simultaneously changes in norms and institutions are important. Change can
7 A thoughtful cross-disciplinary review of the process of enculturation is Fiske et al. (1998). The psychologist Jerome Bruner (1990, p. 21) emphasizes
that  culture gives individuals a tool kit with many mental tools: “The tool kit of any culture can be described as a set of prosthetic devices by which human
beings  can exceed or even redeﬁne the ‘natural limits’ of human functioning.”
8 The sociologist Schutz (2013[1953], p. 22–23) writes that “‘rational action’ on the common-sense level is always action within an unquestioned...frame
of  [social] constructs. . .Thus we may  say that on this level actions are at best partially rational. . .”  (emphasis added). The sociologist Mary Douglas argues
that  “individual minds are furnished with culturally given attitudes” (1986, p. 122), which individuals cannot easily recognize (see also pp. 76, 83, 126).
Economists use the term “rational actor” not to suggest a high level of thinking, but only to mean a certain kind of consistency in behavior. The fact that
experience and exposure can change the mental models (schemas) that an individual uses and, thus, his framing of a given situation and the decisions he
makes  will lead to behavior that violates consistency.
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Table  2
Taxonomy of inﬂuences in behavioral economics, with examples from this paper.
Inﬂuences in the moment of decision
(Strand one of behavioral economics)
Durable inﬂuences
(Strand two of behavioral economics)
Non-social inﬂuences Priming
• Images of money increased self-reliance but
decreased helpfulness to strangers
•  Having a lockable box and passbook increased savings
Experience
• People who live in the temperate zone adopt heuristics for
judging distance that distort their perception of distance in a
desert
Social inﬂuences Priming
• Priming bankers’ professional identity made them
less honest
• A sign with an injunctive norm (don’t steal)
decreased stealing
• A sign with a descriptive norm (stealing is common)
increased stealing.
Framing
• Fines for late pick-ups of children at a day-care center
increased late pick-ups
Experience
• A sense of collective identity enhances altruism towards
group members
• The culture of honor may  cause men to perceive a loss from
coordination failure as an insult, triggering retaliation that
impedes the emergence of mutually beneﬁcial conventions
• A stigmatized social identity may diminish group solidarity
and impair individuals’ cognitive performance
•  Experiencing a low-trust society tends to reduce intrinsic
honesty
• The color distinctions in one’s language increase how quickly
one recognizes color differences
•  Rice culture in China increases holistic cognition (focus on
context)
Exposure
•  Exposure in school to the ideology of economics increases
selﬁshness and preferences for efﬁciency at the cost of equality
•  Exposure to women  in respected roles in the workforce and
in  soap operas gave villagers in India a new sense of the value
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•  Exposure to soap operas in which women  had few children
reduced fertility rates in Brazil
lternatively begin at the institutional level, but will matter little if there is no change in individuals’ mental models. 9 That
s, mental models have to be in people’s heads and also in their worlds. People and their worlds make each other up (Markus
nd Kitayama, p. 421). This gives a useful perspective on societal rigidity and change.
.3. Outline of the paper
The objective of this paper is to develop this tentative taxonomy of the social determinants of individual behavior,
oing beyond Arrow’s analysis of the social determinants of choice sets to the social determinants of the process of making
ecisions.10 We  contrast that taxonomy with the social determinants of behavior in standard economics (Section 2) and in
ehavioral economics with quasi-rational agents (Section 3).
In standard economics, the social determinants of behavior are prices and the rules of the game. Standard economics
an take into account social preferences. For example, it can easily allow that individuals may  be fair, altruistic, or spiteful.
hey may  enjoy interacting with others. In this expanded standard model, the social determinants of behavior include the
elfare of others and some elements of their consumption. This is the subject of Section 2.
Early work in behavioral economics relaxed the central assumption of standard economics—full rationality. This early
ork allowed that primes and context in the moment of decision could shape how an individual construed himself and his
hoices. For example, what social identity, role models, reference points, or norms were salient to him at the moment of
ecision? A seemingly irrelevant change in context could lead to preference reversals. Rabin (1998) and DellaVigna (2007)
eview this work. Section 3 reviews, very selectively, socially determined behavior in this framework.
In the strand of behavioral economics on which this paper focuses, experience and exposure may  have durable effects.
hey create mental models, which in turn affect how an individual experiences what he experiences. Both preferences
Section 4) and perception and cognition (Section 5) have social determinants. Cognitive processes that psychologists once
elieved to be universal are now understood to be shaped by experience and exposure.Social context is just “other people.” It is thus natural that Section 6 addresses issues of equilibrium and dynamics. Because
ndividuals’ beliefs and preferences are dependent on others’, society can exhibit rigidities. To overcome the rigidities, the
eliefs and preferences of large numbers of individuals have to change more or less simultaneously. But this sometimes
9 An example from Iyer at al. (2012) is the long period in which laws in India against violence to women  were poorly enforced. A large increase in the
raction of such crimes that the victims reported to the police, and that the police ofﬁcially recorded, occurred as a result of the change in attitudes towards
omen after political reservations gave women seats on village and district councils. Basu (2015) argues that changes in law, if they are contrary to what
ould  have been an equilibrium in the absence of the law, will have little power.
10 Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) provide a somewhat different taxonomy.
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happens. We  give examples in which an exogenous change in context caused more-or-less simultaneous mental model
switches by many interdependent actors and, thus, led to substantial behavioral changes that may  help sustain the initial
exogenous change in context. The examples include (a) political reservations for women  as village leaders in randomly
selected villages in India, (b) the mobilization of poor women  in self-help groups in India, and (c) the exposure of different
areas of Brazil to soap operas in which all the female characters had few or no children.11
The paper describes laboratory, ﬁeld, and natural experiments that we  believe provide convincing evidence of observed
behavioral changes that are markedly different from what standard economics would predict. There are social impacts on
behavior that cannot be accounted for only by changes in choice sets and information, but that are best understood as changes
in preferences and socially-determined cognition. Section 7 discusses the normative considerations raised by policies that
try to affect individuals’ mental models, and Section 8 concludes.
2. Interpersonal effects in standard models: interdependent utility
This section summarizes the way that standard economics has been extended to incorporate social determinants of
choices. The extensions do this by allowing others’ consumption to directly affect one’s own welfare. They retain the assump-
tion of standard economics that the individual’s preferences and ways of processing information are ﬁxed, unaffected by
social elements. Behavior is described as if the individual maximizes a utility function deﬁned over his own  and possibly
others’ consumption (actions). For many decades, economists worked on enriching the standard models while retaining the
core assumption of ﬁxed preferences and a ﬁxed way of processing information.
It is straightforward to extend the standard framework to include the consumption of others:
Max
xi
Ui(xi, x−i). (2.1)
The individual’s utility in (2.1) depends on the vector of his own  consumption, xi, and that of others, x−i; there are external-
ities. With utility functions of this form, preferences—how an individual ranks alternative consumption bundles—depend in
general on others’ consumption, i.e. there is not separability, as in:
Max
xi
Ui(xi, x−i) = u(xi) + ˚(x−i). (2.2)
Only in that case would the choices that the individual makes be independent of the choices made by others.
Eq. (2.1) shows the general way that the standard theory might treat interdependent utility. By imposing more structure
on preferences (on utility functions), we can go beyond this to make more precise predictions of behavior. We focus on
two cases—where the individual’s utility depends on relative consumption, and where his utility depends on coordinated
consumption. A striking result in both cases is the effect on choices over leisure.
2.1. Relative consumption
Under the relative consumption hypothesis, the individual obtains pleasure from how well he is doing relative to others.
Positional goods are valued because others cannot consume them. As Veblen once claimed,
[I]n any community where goods are held in severalty it is necessary, in order to his own  peace of mind, that an
individual should possess as large a portion of goods as others with whom he is accustomed to class himself; and it is
extremely gratifying to possess something more than others. (Veblen, 1899 [2007], 25)
An extensive literature explores the behavioral implications of this hypothesis.12 Behavior can be markedly different
from that predicted in standard models. For instance, in a model in which utility depends on the relative consumption of
goods but the absolute level of leisure, the equilibrium level of leisure does not change when the wage rate changes.13
Under some assumptions, an increase in wage inequality decreases aggregate leisure. In intertemporal extensions of this
framework, Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) show that the dependence of utility on relative (conspicuous) consumption does
not necessarily lower the savings rate.
2.2. Coordination utilityThe utility that an individual obtains from consuming certain things depends on others’ consuming similar things. We
call this special case coordination utility. The enjoyment one gets from seeing a play or movie depends on the ability to
discuss it with others, and this is best done if they too have seen the play or movie. Fads and fashions can be understood in
11 See (a) Beaman et al. (2009, 2012) and Iyer et al. (2012); (b) Sanyal et al. (2015); and (c) La Ferrara et al. (2012).
12 See Stiglitz (2008) and Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) and the references cited therein. Between Veblen’s early work and the more recent work of Arrow
and  Dasgupta and Stiglitz stands a considerable amount of macroeconomic work based on the “relative income hypothesis.” See, e.g., Duesenberry (1949).
13 Proposition B1 in Stiglitz (2008). This is true in the absence of wage inequality. A corollary is that changes in the wage do not change welfare in
equilibrium, even though they change consumption levels.
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 similar way: it is hard to conceive a single individual in isolation enjoying a hula hoop. The value of coordinating free time
an also be understood in this way: the enjoyment an individual receives from a weekend or vacation day may  depend on
hether his spouse has the weekend off or the same vacation day. These examples highlight the social nature of what gives
s pleasure. One important source of well-being are our interactions with others.14 Patterns of consumption that enhance
hose interactions enhance well-being.
Stiglitz (2008) shows that there may  be multiple equilibria. For example, if it is the norm for employers to give short
acations, the value of a longer vacation will be limited, and so employees will not request (or value) longer vacations of
heir employers. But there can be another equilibrium with longer vacations. The latter equilibrium may  generate higher
evels of utility than the former.
.3. Efﬁciency and collective action
In Eq. (2.1), individuals make choices by focusing on only their own  utility: they choose xi to maximize Ui with no regard
o the consequences for others’ well-being. Obviously, the market (Nash) equilibrium in such an economy will not be efﬁcient
nless we can devise market mechanisms that force individuals to internalize the externalities. But that requires the creation
f a large number of markets and associated property rights.15 In this “system” an individual would have to purchase the
ight to take an action that affects others’ welfare. As Arrow (1969) observes, this would be neither practical nor normatively
easible. Since the impact of person i’s actions on person j may  be observable only to j (and possibly to i), this kind of Coasian
olution simply will not work.
However, social scientists have become aware of the more complex nature of many social interactions. Ostrom (1990) has
hown that societies sometimes do design cooperative equilibria using repeated games to ensure that it is in the individual’s
elﬁsh interest to be other-regarding. Her work is consistent with the large literature that shows how cooperative equilibria
an emerge in the context of games in which a group of players interact repeatedly. In the indeﬁnitely repeated game, it
an be in the self-interest of individuals to take into account how their actions affect others. Norms to support this can be
stablished, which are sometimes referred to as social capital. It can even be in the self-interest of individuals to punish
orm violators, including free-riders who shirk by not punishing others who  violate norms.16 In these models, individuals
re selﬁsh, but the repeated game provides incentives to act cooperatively. Societies that have constructed repeated games
o sustain welfare-enhancing cooperation are said to have high levels of social capital.17
But a disturbing implication of the social capital literature is that essentially any Pareto-efﬁcient equilibrium can be sup-
orted, including equilibria entailing the exploitation of one group—such as African-Americans under Jim Crow. Those who
iolated the Jim Crow norm were punished. Discriminatory equilibria can persist unless there is an exogenous intervention.18
Policy restricting the set of variables that can be used as the basis of hiring can move the economy from one equilibrium
o another. Such a policy entails very limited intervention by government and at very low cost: all that is required is to
rohibit certain actions. In the new equilibrium, it is not in anyone’s interest to undertake the actions.19 Social context
n these models is important—far more important than in the case of standard models. The repeated “games” change the
onsequences of individual actions, thereby affecting incentives and the nature of the equilibria that emerge. These models
re not about changing individual preferences.
.4. Societal learning and the evolution of preferences over time
As we have emphasized, a key characteristic of standard theory in economics is that preferences are ﬁxed; they do not
hange over time. But, in fact, the choices we make today depend on the choices we and others have made in the past. It is
ot just that we learn what we like. Our way of perceiving the world can change. By experience, we  can also become better
t consuming certain things (“learning by consuming”). Because we  get better at ﬁguring out how to derive pleasure from
he ownership/consumption of certain things, our demand for those things increases. This gives rise to a recursive structure
o utility:Max
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14 See Putnam (2000). Young and Lim (2014) show that the unemployed gain comparatively little beneﬁt from time off on weekdays, when others go to
ork. Both the unemployed and the employed experience a large and similar increase in well-being and in social time on weekends (Figs. 2 and 3). Thus
he  authors argue that time is better understood as a network good than as analogous to money, in which the main concern is the quantity.
15 Traditionally, families have been modeled as if they maximized a family social welfare function, i.e., they fully integrated the impact of the actions of
ach  on the other members of the family. More recent work, however, convincingly shows that models in which family behavior is described by a repeated
ame  (as discussed below) provide a better description of family behavior. Arrow’s work on collective decision-making (Arrow, 1963[1951]) shows that
hort  of either full integration of their preferences or one member of the family acting as dictator, there is no set of decision (voting) rules that lead to
onsistent behavior.
16 Abreu (1988). This section draws heavily on Kraft-Todd et al. (2015). See also the references they cite.
17 There is a large formal and informal literature on social capital; see, e.g., Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000).
18 See Dasgupta (2011) and Acharya et al. (2015). These results are markedly different from those suggested by Becker (1957).
19 See, e.g. Stiglitz (1974).
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The second term, i, is the direct utility from consuming xit−1 when others consume xt−1−i. The ﬁrst term, Uti, is the
continuation function: the utility that the individual will receive over the rest of his life given (xit−1, xt−1−i) and given his
“new choices” xit and those of others.20 An individual’s marginal utility from consuming a particular good at time t is affected
by his and others’ consumption of that good at time t − 1 and in all other previous periods.
In this model, individuals at time t − 1 should think about the implications of their choices for the future. There is a sense
in which our actions at one time shape who we  are (deﬁned by the choices we make) at later dates. Again, only in the case
of temporal separability (i.e. how the individual ranks alternative consumption bundles is ﬁxed over time) would that not
be true.
Myopia and inefﬁciency. If individuals are myopic, they may  not fully take into account how today’s consumption affects
the future. There is also a normative issue: at time t, their valuation of past consumption may  be different from their
contemporaneous valuation of that consumption. From a normative point of view, how should that earlier consumption be
valued?
This model, too, can give rise to multiple equilibria, as we discuss in the following application to choices over consumption
versus leisure.
Learning and preferences. Societies that consume more “goods” may  become better and better at consuming goods; those
that start out enjoying more leisure may  become better and better at that. Some societies may  get trapped in a high-
consumerism equilibrium.
It has been observed that over the past half century, large differences between US nationals and Europeans in
consumption-leisure choices have developed. Europeans on the whole choose more leisure. Some 80 years ago, Keynes
raised the question of how individuals would spend the productivity dividend—the fact that technological change permits us
to meet the basic necessities of life in a few hours of work a week. The standard economic model provides no clear answer:
there are income and substitution effects, the former suggesting more leisure since we  are richer, and the latter suggests
less leisure since the opportunity cost of consumption is so much lower. Forty-ﬁve years ago, there did not appear to be any
systematic differences between the choices made by US nationals and Europeans. Today, there are.
Stiglitz (2008) puts forward several hypotheses for the behavioral differences,21 some of them related to the models
presented here. In particular, individuals can learn how to consume goods better, or to enjoy leisure better. Much learning is
social learning—learning from others. Moreover, there is contagion of values: an individual may  value goods more if others
do.
Inequality, emulation, and societal behavior Individuals tend to emulate those who are viewed within their society as
successful. The successful become role models, and there is again a social multiplier effect. In a society in which high value
is placed on material success, the role models are the materially successful. Others will seek to follow their consumption
patterns, reinforcing the value placed on material success.
In societies with a high level of inequality that have developed a high level of consumerism (a high value on the con-
sumption of material goods, with one’s well-being partly affected by relative consumption), those who  are ahead will strive
to distinguish themselves from the rest by working harder; those who are behind will strive particularly hard to keep up
with the Joneses. This may  lead short-sighted individuals to get into debt—and there is evidence that this actually occurs,
with indebtedness higher in communities with greater inequality.
While this model goes beyond the standard assumptions of separability and independence, we  have expressed it
totally in the language of standard economics. Some economists, for example Schelling (1984), have studied special
cases, e.g. addiction. The consumption of opium today affects preferences for opium and other goods tomorrow and later
on.
Many of the reduced forms of the models presented below are similar to Eq. (2.3), even if the structural models—and
therefore some of the points of intervention—are different. While in a formal sense, the individual in Eq. (2.3) is “shaped” by
his previous experiences, all of this is laid out at time 0. It is known at time 0 what his preferences will be like at a later date
if he has certain experiences, including certain interactions. While much of the remainder of the paper can be reframed as
special cases of this model, hopefully the discussion in later sections will provide a far richer interpretation of how it is that
social interactions (the social context) shape the individual. We  will emphasize the role of cognition. What matters is not
so much what others do (as this model suggests) as how the individual perceives what they do and how he perceives the
individuals themselves, and this is socially determined. It is affected by the individual’s mental model. By changing mental
models, we change behavior. Mental models can be changed by the behavior of others with whom we interact (e.g., as we
see how role models behave), but it can, as we  shall see, also be affected by the behavior of others with whom we  have no
direct interactions (e.g., actors in a TV soap opera).20 It should be obvious that this formulation itself is not fully general. It assumes that the individual can describe the level of well-being he obtains from
his  consumption today independently of his future choices. But it may be that an individual describing his experiences over his lifetime will evaluate current
experiences in light of consumption that occurs after the date of consumption. The knowledge that he will do so will affect his consumption today.
21 There have been some attempts to explain these differences in terms of regulations or involuntary unemployment. Stiglitz (2008) argues elsewhere
that  those attempts are unpersuasive.
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pig. 1. Percentage of participants who asked for help as a function of a money prime and the length of time that had elapsed while working on a difﬁcult
ask.
ource. Vohs et al. (2006).
. How context in the moment of decision affects behavior
As the previous section shows, it is not difﬁcult to augment standard models to take account of individuals’ other-regarding
nd norm-regarding actions. But this is a limited view of how social elements affect behavior. It maintains the assumptions
hat the decision-maker is rational and has ﬁxed preferences: the structure of his utility function (even if socially oriented)
s unaffected by others.
In the past quarter century, the new ﬁeld of behavioral economics has emerged, showing that the economic model based
n rationality does not provide an explanation of individuals’ behavior in many contexts. Individuals diverge systematically
rom rational behavior; they are, to use the title of Ariely’s 2008 book, “predictably irrational.” Thus, if Kahneman were
o analyze the behavior of Robinson Crusoe on his island, he would easily identify irrational aspects of his behavior—for
xample, Crusoe might make systematic mistakes in judgment concerning small probability events and have conﬁrmatory
ias and loss aversion. This section focuses on how priming is an important part of this predictably irrational behavior.
.1. Priming intrinsic versus extrinsic rewards
It has long been recognized that individuals act differently under extrinsic than under intrinsic rewards (see Bénabou
nd Tirole, 2003). Recent experiments demonstrate that priming money, the most important extrinsic reward, can induce
eople to be more self-reliant and also more selﬁsh. In an experiment at the University of Minnesota, undergraduate subjects
ere randomly placed in one of three treatments: (1) money prime,  (2) Monopoly money prime,  and (3) control (Vohs et al.,
006). All subjects undertook a descrambling task; they were given nonsense phrases and asked to arrange the words into
 sensible phrase. In the money prime treatment,  one-half of the nonsense phrases included words related to money, while
n the other two groups, all phrases were neutral. In the Monopoly money treatment,  a stack of Monopoly money was  placed
n the subjects’ visual periphery. In the control, there were no primes to money.
After the descrambling task, the individuals in each group were given a difﬁcult but solvable task. As the experimenter
eft the room, he told them that if they desired help, he was available. There was no statistical difference in behavior
etween the treatments that used the money prime and that used the play money, and both were statistically different
rom the control. Participants primed for money persevered almost twice as long in trying to solve a difﬁcult problem before
equesting assistance—see Fig. 1. The authors replicated a version of the experiment and found consistent results. All that
his experiment suggests so far is that thinking about money makes people behave with greater self-reliance.22 We  will
rgue shortly that this is economically signiﬁcant.There is also evidence that a money prime makes us less helpful to others. The authors conducted the same descrambling
ask on students from the University of British Columbia, this time just with a money prime and a control. After the priming
ask was completed, the experimenter explained that she was  an undergraduate who was  looking for help coding data. She
22 To conﬁrm that the treatment activated the concept of money in the minds of the treatment group, all participants performed word-stem completion
asks.  One-third of the word-stems could be completed with either money-related or neutral words (for example, CO can be completed as “coin” or
cord”). The money prime treatment group used more money-related words than the control group. Post-experimental questionnaires indicated that
articipants did not realize that they had been primed with the concept of money.
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asked whether the participants would be able to help. She explained that each data sheet takes approximately ﬁve minutes
to code. The subjects were left alone to indicate how many they would be willing to code. People who had been primed with
the money condition volunteered about half as much time as the control group (25 min  compared to 43 min). Versions of
the experiment were replicated to explore generalizability, and consistent results were observed.
This example is useful in showing how an individual’s selﬁshness can easily be primed. But in some sense, the example
belongs in the next subsection of the paper on the role of social context in priming: for money is a social construction. Robinson
Crusoe living alone would not have need of money. This is the simplest example of a social construction affecting behavior.
It induces the individual to think more about his material needs.
We suspect that similar results might be elicited by materialistic primes that are not (or not always) social constructions.
Thus, if individuals were mildly hungry, then in societies in which individuals rely on individual efforts to obtain food, a food
prime might elicit more selﬁsh behavior. By contrast, in hunter societies in which individuals have to cooperate to obtain
food, there might be at most a weakly selﬁsh response. To our knowledge, these alternative hypotheses have not been tested.
However, in Section 5 we explain how the differences in the need for cooperation in growing two different crops, wheat
and rice, have led to persistent differences in culture, which are reﬂected in the mental models that individuals draw upon,
their perception, and their behavior.
Behavioral economics is replete with examples of how context and framing matter. The effects have been demonstrated
in laboratory experiments, in the ﬁeld, and recently even in policy. They are generating extensive replication to test the
generality of the underlying mechanisms and the possibility of scaled-up interventions.
A ﬁeld experiment in Kenya (Dupas and Robinson, 2013) has results consistent with those of the money prime laboratory
experiment. All the subjects received information about preventative health products, and all were encouraged to save in
order to purchase them. Each individual in a randomly chosen group was  given two additional things: a lockable box and a
passbook to label with the product that the individual hoped to purchase with his savings. Having the box and passbook had
large effects on behavior. The proportion of people who  reached their savings goals was  only one-third in the control group
(without the box and passbook but with the encouragement) but one-half for those who  also had the box and passbook. The
amount of spending on preventative health products in the past 12 months was  66–75% higher for those with the lockable
box compared to those with only verbal encouragement to save for health needs.
How did the subjects manage to increase their spending on health products? Post-interview surveys suggest that the
lockable box and labelled passbook helped the individuals mentally allocate money for savings.23 The box and passbook also
made the individuals feel less obligated to share with others when their only available cash was in the box.24 The mental
accounting changed the way the subjects addressed temptations to spend and pressures to share.
3.2. Social context and priming
Behavior is often best described as if individuals had multiple identities: distinct sets of beliefs, preferences, and behaviors.
Social context affects which identity is most salient. The model of multiple identities, common in the psychological literature,
is anathema to most economists, who are trained to view the individual as a unitary being, who  acts in a consistent manner
when exposed to different choices. We  suggest that there are at least some aspects of human nature that are more consistent
with the psychologists’ concept of the individual than with the concept in standard economics, even if the standard economic
model of the unitary, consistent individual may  be useful for many purposes, e.g. the choice between red and green lettuce.
A recent experiment shows that dishonest behavior is stimulated in bankers merely by priming them for their professional
identity (Cohn et al., 2014). Employees of banks, including a large international bank, participated in a task in which they
could increase their income by up to $200. The task was  to toss a coin 10 times and report the results online. Each winning
toss could be worth $20. (Subjects were told that they would be paid only if the number of their winning tosses was at least
as great as the number for a random player from the pilot study. In this way, researchers aimed to mimic  the competitive
environment of the banking industry.) Employees were more dishonest when their professional identity of bank employee
was made salient by asking a small number of questions about their professional work in the pre-experiment survey. In
Fig. 2, the black bars show the predicted distribution of returns if there is honest reporting of coin tosses. The grey bars in
the left panel show the distribution of returns in the control group. The grey bars in the right panel show the distribution
of returns in the treatment group, in which banker identity was  primed. The grey bars in the right panel yield signiﬁcantly
greater mean earnings than those in the left panel.
This shift can be explained by norms of bankers that permit dishonesty, so that stimulating in the minds of bankers ideas
related to banking increases their dishonesty by putting their behavior within the banker “compartment” of their lives.25
Cues to banking have no such effect on individuals who are not bankers. The ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis
23 This result is consistent with the “mental models” analysis presented in Sections 4 and 5. It is also consistent with the results of a ﬁeld experiment in
India  that seemingly inconsequential actions—earmarking a portion of weekly earnings for savings by putting it into a separate envelope, and partitioning
the  earmarked funds into two envelopes—increased savings (Soman and Cheema, 2011).
24 Dupas and Robinson, pp. 1164–65.
25 There is another explanation: earlier, we showed that simply priming an individual with the idea of money leads to more selﬁsh behavior. Obviously,
when  one is a banker, one is constantly being reminded of money, so that it is not a surprise that a banker primed about banking would act more selﬁshly.
K. Hoff, J.E. Stiglitz / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 126 (2016) 25–57 35
0
10
20
30
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
0 20 40 60 80 100120140160180200
Earnings (in US dollars)
Control Binomial
0
10
20
30
0 20 40 60 80 100120140160180200
Earnings (in US dollars)
Professional identity Binomial
Fig. 2. Distribution of earnings predicted for a fair coin toss (black bars in both panels) and the actual distribution of earnings by bankers without a prime
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ource: Cohn et al. (2014).
hat social cues have a “programming” role on behavior. Anything that changes how individuals think may  also change how
hey act.26
This experiment is instructive in several ways. The ﬁrst way, which is the subject of the next section (Section 4), is that
t is possible that becoming a banker changes who an individual is. Being part of the “culture” of banking may  entail having
trong beliefs that bankers should not be regulated; that governments are bad; and that when bankers behave badly, they
hould not be punished. A second implication of the experiment is that the banking culture may  inculcate norms that entail
reater approval of selﬁshness. This experiment has not tested this hypothesis—indeed, it does not even test whether bankers
ho have not been primed are more or less dishonest than non-bankers, though the results for the non-primed individuals
uggest not. But we could imagine experiments that did test that (for example, an experiment with random hiring of similar
ndividuals that ascertained behavioral changes after a period of being a banker).
What this experiment does show is that when individuals think of themselves as bankers, they act in a more selﬁsh
ay. (Those who go into banking may, on average, be more selﬁsh, so observing more selﬁsh behavior from bankers than
on-bankers in a non-experimental setting would not indicate that banking has shaped the individuals.) The experiment
uggests that whether or not being a banker has changed an individual’s deep preferences, when he is working in a bank, he
s constantly being “primed” about banking, constantly reminded that he is a banker and, thus, he and all of those around
im tend to act in more selﬁsh ways.
It is easy to show, of course (see Appendix A) that if those around one are acting in a dishonest and selﬁsh way, it is optimal
or one to act in a more dishonest and selﬁsh way. Thus, being a dishonest and selﬁsh banker is part of a social equilibrium.
As Kahneman (2003; 2011, especially ch. 4)) and the literature on fast thinking emphasize, being primed can sometimes
e viewed as simply part of “fast thinking.” Fast thinking has the individual thinking of himself in a “banker equilibrium” in
hich being dishonest and selﬁsh is the optimal way to behave.)
.3. Other aspects of social context eliciting selﬁsh or altruistic behavior
There are other examples in which a change in social context elicits more selﬁsh behavior. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000)
escribe an Israeli day care center that imposed a ﬁne to induce parents to pick up their children on time. As Sandel (2012)
oints out, charging a fee (or imposing a ﬁne) converted a social obligation not to be late into a conventional market exchange.
he ﬁne led to responses that were different from those anticipated (and predicted by the standard economic model): the
ne increased the fraction of parents who picked up their children late. One can think of individuals as having a selﬁsh
dentity and an identity that is more other-oriented. Which identity gets expressed depends on the framing. Framing a
elationship as a cooperative venture primes the socially conscious identity; framing it as a monetary arrangement primes
he selﬁsh identity. The former framing proved more effective in motivating parents to be punctual. To put it another way,
he social and intrinsic incentives induced greater rule compliance than the pecuniary incentives, and the latter undermined
he former.
26 There is direct evidence that the prime changed the thinking of the individuals, which is consistent with the theory of mental models described below.
hen  asked to turn word fragments into meaningful words, the subjects primed with their professional identity of banker were more likely to generate
ank-related words—for instance, turning the word fragment “ oker” into “broker” as opposed to “smoker”—than those whose banker identities were
ot  made salient. The professional identity treatment increased by 40% the frequency of banker-related words. This is just another instance of priming.
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4. Deep social determinants of preferences
The previous section explained how a prime could shift an individual’s behavior markedly: the social context of the
moment of decision could affect the actions the individual takes. But who  the individual was, was given. The individual who
had picked up his child on time from the nursery school without pecuniary incentives to do so, was  the same individual
who picked up his child late when he had a monetary incentive to be on time. No one suggests that in a deep sense this one
exposure to ﬁnancial incentives changed the individual’s identity; it affected only how he behaved in that particular social
context.
The remainder of this paper is about social determinants of deep preferences and of perception and cognition. We  argue
that the “self” is not given, so that what primes or elicits certain behaviors is not ﬁxed. (It still may  be predictable how
exposure to certain social contexts affects individual preferences, including the way  individuals respond to certain choice
sets and primes.)
As we observed in the introduction to this paper, who an individual is—his preferences and his identity or set of
identities—is endogenous. His experiences affect them. A child’s “fast thinking” when exposed to a hot substance is affected
by his learning from being burned.
Cognitive psychology describes automatic thinking and identiﬁes biases, e.g., conﬁrmatory bias, that are universal in
form but not necessarily in content. Conﬁrmatory bias says that I discount information, paying less attention to it, if it is
inconsistent with my  prior beliefs; but it does not explain where those prior beliefs come from.
Some prior beliefs might be almost universal. The way that individuals treat rare events has universal consequences for a
wide range of things that are rare. But if we were to change the environment in such a way  that the rare event was no longer
rare, then that event would not fall into the category of being rare (by deﬁnition) and its treatment would therefore differ.
Robinson Crusoe living on an island in the Arctic would have come up with frameworks of thinking that were sensitive to
that physical environment. His fast thinking would respond subtly to certain changes in cold weather, and be of little use
if he were transported to a tropical island. And vice versa if Crusoe had spent years living on a tropical island, and then
were suddenly transported to an Arctic island. The physical environment thus affects individuals fast thinking and even
perception.
In this paper, we are concerned more narrowly with how social context affects individual preferences and cognition and,
thereby, behavior.
4.1. Basic concepts
The previous section described how society as a whole primes certain social identities. But society as a whole does
more than prime certain identities and worldviews. It validates them and the perceptions on which they are based. People
seek approval of others and want conﬁrmation that their perceptions are correct and that their behavior is, in some sense,
appropriate. For the most part, the conﬁrmation comes from others,  from the fact that others in the individual’s group, with
whom he identiﬁes, see the world similarly and share a similar set of norms.
Most importantly, society creates identities, worldviews, and other mental models that individuals use to process infor-
mation and interpret the world. As we noted in the introduction, parents work hard to inculcate their mental models and
values in their children. A child who is brought up to believe that littering is wrong is uncomfortable when he litters, not
because he will be punished—he is uncomfortable even in situations where he knows it will not be detected. He comes to
believe he is not that kind of a person.
The most obvious instances of the social construction of preferences arise in contexts in which individuals are relating to
others, as in the relationship between Crusoe and Friday. As noted earlier, Friday would feel as uncomfortable giving orders
as Crusoe would feel receiving them. Their identities were formed in a social context quite different from the island upon
which they have been shipwrecked; but those identities continue, even as they seem inappropriate in the new situation.
To return to the banker example, we saw that when a banker was  primed with his professional identity, he tended to
behave differently. The immediate social context affected his behavior. An individual can again be thought of as having a
number of potential identities; the social contexts in which he was placed in earlier periods determine which one is “expressed”
or realized. Our hypothesis is that having spent time as a banker changes the individual, so that he is more likely to act in
a selﬁsh or dishonest way even when he is not in the context of banking or being primed about banking. Many believe that
becoming a banker affects who the individual is in the fundamental sense that it affects the choices he makes in a variety of
circumstances—even outside his profession and interactions with other bankers.27
Though the experiment that we reported does not test this hypothesis, an experiment on law school students gives
evidence of a case in which exposure to ideology affects preferences. Fisman et al. (2009) exploit a natural experiment in
education—random assignment to instructors in the mandatory ﬁrst-term curriculum at Yale Law School—in order to assess
the effect on distributional preferences of exposure to different ideologies. The instructors in the ﬁrst-term courses are
27 This is fundamentally different from how social capital, as conventionally deﬁned, affects behavior; for as we have noted, in standard economic
environments with social capital, the social context affects the individual’s extrinsic or external payoffs, while here, we are concerned with the individual’s
sense  of his own  being, as he deﬁnes himself.
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ncouraged to design the syllabus as they see ﬁt. The study focused on instructors in the ﬁrst-term course on contracts and
orts. It identiﬁed ideological differences among instructors on the basis of whether the instructor had a PhD in economics,
 PhD in a humanistic discipline, or neither. Standard economics evaluates contracts according to the incentives they give
eople to deploy resources efﬁciently, whereas the humanities include a more egalitarian view of the role of contracts
s a way to share value. The study ﬁnds that students exposed to instructors with economics degrees displayed greater
references for efﬁciency (i.e., for increasing total payoffs) relative to those exposed to instructors with degrees in the
umanities, who displayed greater preferences for equality. Students exposed to instructors with economics degrees also
isplayed greater selﬁshness than those exposed to instructors with humanities degrees. Those exposed to instructors with
nly a J.D. degree exhibited intermediate selﬁshness. The ﬁndings are striking since the random exposure to ideology was
elatively brief (only one semester).
A look ahead
Perhaps the most important aspects of the social determination of deep preferences are interlinked with perception and
ognition, for instance, regarding gender, race, and caste. These aspects are discussed in Section 5.
That an individual’s beliefs and sense of self are a function of the beliefs and perceptions of others implies that there
ay be societal rigidities. Because of the difﬁculty of changing behaviors in a coordinated way, even a Pareto inferior
ash equilibrium may  persist. Both Sections 5 and 6 explore this idea. Perceptions can sometimes be changed in a coordi-
ated way, and this opens up new possibilities for societal change. We  give many examples, especially in Sections 5.2 and
.7.
.2. A simple model of endogenous preferences/behavior
We  consider an individual confronting a set of market constraints, represented by the prices (including wages and interest
ates) at which he can buy and sell goods. The individual lives for two periods. We focus on his behavior in the second period,
hen his choices when confronted with prices pt are a function of his experiences in the ﬁrst period of his life. The experiences
hat this simple model takes into account are his observations of the behavior of adults and, in particular, their choices, at−1.
ollowing our earlier discussion, individuals have multiple possible identities. The one that they become28 is affected by the
ocial context (at−1) in which they are embedded. Thus for all individuals in a given society29
at = H(pt , at−1). (4.1)
Here, the individual’s actions, at, as an adult are affected by his observations concerning all the choices being made by
ll the adults, not just his parents.30 In this general formulation, his parents or some other role model (e.g., the community
eader) could have more inﬂuence than others, and there are specializations of (4.1) that can highlight such dependencies.
ocusing on the steady state, a social equilibrium is one in which
a∗ = H(p∗, a∗) (4.2)
 itself is, of course, determined socially, e.g., through market processes, summarized by the excess demand, Z, of all goods
qual to zero:
Z(p, a) = 0. (4.3)
Any solution to (4.2) and (4.3) is a social equilibrium.
It should be obvious that there can exist multiple social equilibria. Even if ex ante the members of two  different societies
re identical, so that they have the same potential to be selﬁsh or hard-working or trustworthy, etc., the two societies that
ctually emerge can be quite different. Slight variants of this idea are developed in the appendices and in the next two
ubsections.
.3. Social determination of the susceptibility to priming
The previous section focused on how the social experiences of an individual (the social context in which he is embedded
s a child) affect his rational choices as an adult. It is as if those initial experiences determine which of the possible selves an
ndividual becomes. In a slightly more complicated formulation of the model, those experiences determine how an individual
esponds to certain primes, or stimuli (S), when he is in “fast thinking” mode. The stimuli include certain aspects of the social
ontext at time t, but could also include many other primes. Individuals in fast thinking mode do not necessarily act the
ame way all the time. What we mean by endogenous preferences is that past experience makes it more likely that a certain
28 We avoid using the term “choose” because there may  not be an element of conscious choice of which identity to “express.” This formulation stands in
ontrast to that of Bénabou and Tirole (2002), where individuals can effectively choose which of their multiple possible selves they become.
29 This formulation ignores the non-social experiences. These can easily be incorporated into the analysis. Moreover, the way a child interprets the social
ontext (behavior) may  be affected by still other variables, which could be incorporated into the model.
30 In the model, all face similar choices. The model can be extended to situations where different individuals confront different choice sets.
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identity will be expressed, given a prime S. We  thus say that the probability, P, of responding to prime S with action at given
prices pt is determined by “who the individual has become,” i.e., by his past social experiences:
P(at; S, pt) = H(pt, at−1). (4.4)
This would replace Eq. (4.1). By describing the set of stimuli to which individuals are exposed (the probability that an
individual will receive a certain prime), we can complete the description of the social equilibrium.31
4.4. Deep social determinants of altruism
Part of the sense of self of many, if not most, individuals is that they are not selﬁsh. The most important relations in
individuals’ lives are deﬁned by emotional commitments to others that transcend self-interest.32 Being described as selﬁsh
is a term of opprobrium—not a mark of respect of an individual who  is just playing his role in a Smithian equilibrium, in
which social welfare is maximized (for given preferences and cognition) by each person pursuing his self-interest.33 Even
Adam Smith, whose celebration of the butcher’s and baker’s self-love is championed as the original exposition of the utility
of self-interest, opened The Theory of Moral Sentiments with the claim that
how selﬁsh soever man  may  be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the
fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure
of seeing it (Smith, 2009[1759], p. 13).
Until recently, however, individual behavior that could not be explained as self-interested was  deemed not to matter
at the aggregate level (Fehr and Tyran, 2005). Policies could thus be designed as if people were completely self-interested.
But the policy relevance of pro-social behavior is now well-recognized. For example, the political scientist Putnam (1993,
2000), ﬁrst in Italy and then in the United States, reported suggestive evidence that the strength of civic-spirited behavior
is shaped by, and shapes, social outcomes—including crime, health, and the strength of the economy.34
Altruism and other pro-social behavior often emerge from feelings of collective identity.  This is shown in experiments
with the “dictator game.” The dictator game is a two-person game in which only player 1, the “dictator,” has to make
a decision. He has to decide how much of a given amount of money to pass on to player 2. If, for example, the experi-
menter gives him an endowment of $10 and he passes on $3 dollars, then monetary payoffs in the game are $7 to player
1 and $3 to player 2. Obviously, purely self-interested players would choose to give nothing to player 2. When members
of coffee-producer cooperatives in Uganda played a dictator game, they passed on more money to anonymous members
of their co-ops than to anonymous people from their villages who  were not part of their coop (Baldassarri and Grossman,
2013). Leaders from a particular farmer group or village group were more generous toward members of the groups that
they led. By controlling for the effect of social proximity, the experiment illustrated the effect of group attachment on
behavior.
Repeated interactions can sometimes create a collective identity and thus lead to more other-regarding behavior. An
experiment in India on group lending35 showed that increasing the social interactions among the participants increased
reliability and trust (Feigenberg et al., 2010). Groups receiving loans were randomly assigned to meet once a week or once
a month. Compared to those who met  monthly, individuals meeting weekly were three times less likely to default on
subsequent loans. They were more willing, nearly two  years after the experiment ended, to pool risk with their former
group members. There was no change in the punishment meted out to those who misbehaved. The evidence suggests not
that the greater contact strengthened the ability to enforce social norms, as in the example of social capital in Section 2.3,
but rather that greater contact elicited more altruistic behavior.36
31 The impact of an individual’s observing a particular action in the ﬁrst period on his second-period behavior could depend on whether the individual
is  behaving under “fast” or “slow” thinking (and, obviously, on whether the individual knows that and knows that the prime was  related to the action).
Sociologists emphasize the idea that what an individual has observed affects his mental models and dispositions in ways that are important for the
reproduction or change of social structures.
32 There is more to this than reciprocity or g¨ift exchange,t¨hough relationships in which there are excessive imbalances may suffer as a result of perceptions
of  inequities and unfairness.
33 One reason for this is that there are often large externalities. Externalities are pervasive, since they arise whenever there is imperfect information or
incomplete markets.
34 Putnam’s work is often described as suggesting that there is more social capital in some places than others, but this kind of social capital is different
from  that described earlier in the context of repeated games.
35 Where there is joint liability for repayment of the loans.
36 There are many models of group lending as social capital (e.g., Besley and Coate, 1995), where it is individually rational for individuals to act cooperatively,
as  part of a repeated game. Feigenberg et al.’s results are more consistent with Haldar and Stiglitz’ (2014) interpretation of the bankruptcy of SKS, the largest
micro-ﬁnance bankruptcy in history. Haldar and Stiglitz argue that differences in repayment behavior as a result of differences in social attitudes towards
for-proﬁt lenders and not-for-proﬁt lenders were key: individuals embedded in a situation with a for-proﬁt lender behave differently, even when the ﬁnancial
pay-offs to the borrowers would be the same as those in a situation with a not-for-proﬁt lender.
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. Deep social determinants of perception and cognition
.1. General theory
Man  is a social being. He is social not just in what he does, but also in the lenses through which he perceives himself and
he world. He does not choose the lenses that he uses. They are socially acquired and socially activated.
Earlier, we argued that behavior is affected by what we have experienced—including the behavior of others whom we
ave observed. But in a fundamental sense, what we  perceive is itself socially determined. Society affects our perception and
ognition,37 what we see and how we process and interpret it. Not only does “society” create individuals, it even creates the
ategories that one uses to think about oneself and others. Because how others see an individual affects how he sees himself,
nd because how individuals see themselves affects how they behave (the choices they make and, in a fundamental sense,
ho they are), social constructions—exempliﬁed by categories like race and caste and gender into which individuals place
thers and themselves—can have important implications for social outcomes.38
An individual’s thinking relies partly on assumptions about the way the world works that the individual has not critically
valuated, but instead has absorbed from his experiences and from society. “Most of uniquely human cognition is not
enetically coded for, but rather has been invented, reﬁned, and built up over historical time via the process of cultural
ransmission,” writes the psychologist Michael Tomasello (1999). It is obvious that the language that individuals use is
ocially constructed, and language affects how people process information and categorize objects (Section 5.3). But more
roadly, experience and exposure inﬂuence the mental models that are used to process and interpret information.
An experiment in India illustrates the economic importance that cultural inﬂuences on perception and cognition can
ave. In the experiment, subjects played a two-person stag hunt game. This is a coordination game in which the players
imultaneously and independently choose to either “hunt hare” or “hunt stag.” Hunting hare gives a player a positive but
ow payoff independently of what the other player does. Hunting stag gives a player a high payoff if the other player also
unts stag, but a negative payoff (a loss of part of his endowment for that round) if the other player does not hunt stag. The
xperiment tests individuals’ willingness to conduct a mutually beneﬁcial transaction with an anonymous partner at the
xpense of taking a risk on the partner’s cooperation. The game has two  Nash equilibria: both players hunt stag or both hunt
are. The philosopher Brian Skyrms (2004, p. 9) writes that “the whole problem of adopting or modifying the social contract
or mutual beneﬁt can be seen as a [many-person] stag hunt. . ..the state of nature [is] an equilibrium. . .[and there is] the
roblem of transcending it.”
Based on experiments with US subjects (e.g., Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990), the ability of ﬁxed pairs after a small
umber of rounds to form the social contract was believed to be a general result. But an experiment with men  in north
ndia shows that it is not. In the experiment most low-caste pairs were able to form the social contract, but most high-caste
airs were not (Brooks, Hoff, and Pandey 2015). The high-caste men  appeared to perceive a coordination failure as an insult
o their honor. After obtaining a loss from a coordination failure, only 32% of the players in high-caste pairs continued to
unt stag the next period, compared to 68% of the players in low-caste pairs. The high-caste men  who  suffered a loss in the
oordination failure may  have been motivated to retaliate against their partners. Doing so hurt their ability to signal that they
ould try to achieve the social contract. Their “retaliatory” response to coordination failures tended to block coordination
n the social contract. In contrast, low-caste men  appeared to perceive coordination failures that caused them losses as mere
istakes. A survey provided supporting evidence: high-caste men  were much more likely than low-caste men  to think it
ppropriate to beat up an individual who because of adverse or ambiguous circumstances had caused one a loss.
Because how we perceive the world affects what we  do, it affects in a deep sense who  we  are. Standard economics is built
n the assumption that social worlds do not shape preferences, perception, and cognition. Standard economics assumes that
ndividuals have unlimited powers of objective reasoning. All individuals exposed to the same data and experiences would
ome to the same conclusions. The rational expectations model goes further: it makes sufﬁciently stringent assumptions
hat, with enough dialogue, all individuals would come to hold the same beliefs—there would be common knowledge.39 In
ontrast, cultural psychologists and sociologists take it for granted that society is partly “inside us”: socioeconomic factors
ffect the mental models that inﬂuence how we  process information (e.g., Markus and Kitayama 2010). This section will
ive evidence in support of the view that society shapes perception and cognition. But ﬁrst we  present a simple model.
.2. A simple model, with three examples
A model helps illustrate the difference between the analysis here of the social determinants of perception and cognition
nd the analysis in the previous section on the social determinants of preferences. We  have to introduce the concept of
erception, denoted P. Individuals’ perceptions of their “real experiences” are affected by social stimuli, S. As before, we focus
n one aspect of their experiences, the actions of others. What individuals see and how they interpret what they see (Was it
37 By cognition, we  mean, following DiMaggio (1997, p. 35), both reasoning and the pre-conscious bases of reasoning, including the sense of self,
ategorization, and default assumptions.
38 See, for example, Steele and Aronson (1995), DiMaggio (1997), Hoff and Pandey (2006, 2014), Demeritt and Hoff (2016) Hoff and Walsh (2015).
39 There is an important literature explaining why individuals may in fact “agree to disagree” (a survey is in Bonanno and Nehring, 1997).
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aberration? How was it motivated? What does it indicate about others?) are all socially determined. The perceptions (which
may  themselves be described by a vector of beliefs) determine the individuals’ behavior. Thus, now we write the actions of
all individuals, a, as
at = H(pt; P(at−1, S)). (5.1)
In the steady state, a social equilibrium is one in which
a∗ = H(p∗, P(a∗, S)) (5.2)
As before
Z(p, a) = 0. (5.3)
Obviously, the range of possible equilibria and the scope for policy interventions have increased enormously by taking
into account that people respond to their perceptions rather than to the objective actions. If there is some way we can change
perceptions, we can change behavior—and possibly the equilibrium—without doing much else.
Traditionally, we have had a hard time empirically distinguishing this model from the previous one, since we  do not
typically observe perceptions but only actions. But recent research (some of which is described below) has lent weight
to this model. Studies can sometimes observe, or at least get evidence on, individuals’ perceptions. More recent research
obtains evidence on brain activity. Individuals who  perceive things differently may  have different patterns of brain activity.
Three examples illustrate and apply the ideas just presented.
5.2.1. Political reservations for women in India
In 1993, an amendment to the constitution of India reserved leadership positions for women in randomly selected villages
in every Indian state. In the state of West Bengal, Beaman et al. (2009) measured how exposure to local women leaders
affected villagers’ implicit attitudes toward gender roles. To do this, they used an Implicit Association Test (IAT), which is
widely viewed as a “test that tells us how culture works” (Shepherd, 2011). The IAT examined occupational stereotypes for
men and women. In particular, it examined the associations between male and female names, on the one hand and, on the
other hand, concepts associated with gender-neutral domestic activities (for example, resting at home) and gender-neural
leadership activities (for example, public speaking) (Beaman et al., 2009, p. 1525).
For male respondents, though not for female respondents, exposure to local female leaders signiﬁcantly reduced the
association of domestic scenes with women and of leadership with men. Just seven years’ exposure to local women leaders
also changed the villagers’ behavior. It increased the number of women  who  chose to run for political ofﬁce, and also the
number of women who won ofﬁce in unreserved elections. Thus, the exogenous change in exposure to women  village leaders
(under the constitutional amendment) changed behavior in ways that reproduced to some extent the initial change. The
reservation policy might thus shift society to a new social equilibrium, where what has changed is not only behavior, but
also mental models. The new mental models would then support the new societal equilibrium.
Beaman et al. (2012) measured the effect of the political reservations on parents’ aspirations for their teenagers, and
on teenagers’ aspirations for themselves. Compared with villages that had not yet had political reservations for women, in
villages with seven years’ exposure to reserved women leaders the gap in aspirations for teenage girls and boys fell by 25%
among parents and by 32% among the teenagers themselves. The changes in parents’ aspirations appear to translate into
changes in actions, e.g., in the gender gap in the amount of time that teenagers have to spend on housework.
5.2.2. Women’s livelihood project in India
A poverty alleviation project implemented by the government of the Indian state of Bihar and funded by the World
Bank led to the enrollment of economically and socially disadvantaged women  in savings groups of 10–12 persons, and
to a series of social changes that brought about greater gender equality in a very poor and patriarchal region of India. A
qualitative study (Sanyal et al., 2015) tracked two control and two treatment villages intensively over a three-year period.
The study systematically compared women’s empowerment outcomes in villages where women were actively participating,
and in one where the project was never introduced. The study found that the eight-year project had given women in the
treatment villages exclusive access to certain physical and ﬁnancial resources (such as cheap credit), and also new symbolic
resources and a new institutional environment. The women were organized into a well-deﬁned network called Self-Help
Groups (or SHGs) within and across villages. Once a women’s group had established a record of regular weekly savings, the
group obtained access to loans at rates much lower than those available from village moneylenders. Each group met  once
a week, and the three elected ofﬁcers of each of the groups met  bi-monthly at the village and district levels. A majority
of group members were entering domains and spheres of activity outside the home for the ﬁrst time in their lives. The
groups gave women an identity that cut across castes. The ﬁnancial resources gave women greater bargaining power in
the households, while the solidarity gave them greater political power. Their participation in civic, political, and ﬁnancial
institutions further broke down longstanding gender barriers, thereby “changing both men’s and women’s idea of what it
means to be a woman.” Women  who went outside their homes and courtyards were no longer perceived as immoral for
moving freely. As one participant said, “You know, when a woman sees other women  go out, she is willing to try it out
herself. Now, I too have gone to other villages. . .”  (p. 38). Women  were much more likely to run for elections at the ward
and village level.
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.2.3. Soap operas
Our third and last example of a variable that can change perception, cognition, and preferences is the media. When
eople who have never been exposed to societies with low fertility were exposed to soap operas in which the women  had
ew children, fertility rates declined (Jensen and Oster, 2009; La Ferrara et al., 2012). In Brazil, there was  a sizeable impact
n fertility of exposure to long-running serial dramas produced by a company that deliberately crafted soap operas with
haracters who had few or no children in order to try to bring about social change. In general, the fertility decline in a
unicipality in Brazil began after the ﬁrst year that the municipality had gained access to the TV soap operas. The decline
as especially great for respondents close in age to the leading female character in at least one of the soap operas aired in a
iven year, which is consistent with a role model effect. The decline was comparable to the effect of two additional years in
omen’s education. For women ages 35–44, the decrease was  11% of mean fertility.40
When individuals in South Africa were randomly invited to watch a soap opera that featured a character whose excessive
orrowing and gambling led to her ﬁnancial distress, the viewers’ understanding of ﬁnancial management increased (Berg
nd Zia, 2013). The viewers became less likely to engage in risky ﬁnancial behavior themselves. Focus group ﬁndings suggest
hat their emotional connections with the leading character helped change their behavior.
When a radio soap opera with messages of intergroup tolerance was presented to randomly chosen groups in communities
n Rwanda, the viewers’ perceptions of social norms and desirable behavior shifted. The viewers also became more willing
o express dissent with authority. This is important, since blind deference to authority is believed to be a factor in mass
iolence, such as genocide (Paluck, 2009, Paluck and Green, 2009).
In Nigeria, soap operas are being designed to change behavior in ways that will slow the spread of HIV-AIDS. Experimental
valuation is in progress (Banerjee et al., 2015).
We  have presented three examples in which actions or media inﬂuenced perception, cognition, and behavior. The exam-
les were exposure to women leaders, organization of SHGs, and soap operas. They show that exposure to the new contexts
as clearly shaped individuals. The idea that preferences and the mental models that underlie them are ﬁxed can unambigu-
usly be rejected. Of course, a die-hard devotee of ﬁxed preferences could argue, for example: the soap opera has changed
ndividuals’ posterior distributions concerning the consequences of different behaviors; that is, beliefs about the net payoffs
rom different conduct have changed.
.2.3.1. Alternative interpretations. But at least for some of the laboratory and natural experiments, this interpretation of
hat has happened is far-fetched. In the Indian example in Jensen and Oster, the situation observed in the soap opera is
arkedly different from that of the villages in which the viewers reside. How the middle-class urban husbands in the soap
pera respond to the behavior of their wives is of little relevance to how the husbands of the village women (or other women
n the village) will respond. The soap opera conveys information not so much about how others will respond to the woman,
s about what the possibilities are of actions for the woman. The soap opera conveys a sense of dignity and respect of women
or themselves. The soap opera is changing the women’s own sense of identity. And in doing so, it is changing the women
nd their behavior.
.2.3.2. Beyond short-term priming. These results can be related to priming, but in a distinctively different sense than that
ssociated with fast thinking. Consider our earlier model of individuals with multiple identities: latent in the women  viewers
f the soap opera was an identity with stronger self-regard. The soap opera primes that individual. But it primes it in a way
ith strong hysteresis effects: it is primed not just for the moment, but permanently, or at least durably. Of course, such
hanges are what we mean by endogeneity of preferences.
.3. Language as a social construction
According to Berger and Luckmann (1966), our taken-for-granted understanding of everyday reality emerges from, and
s sustained by, social processes. The concepts and categories we use reﬂect our socially imposed meanings, rather than any
articular natural state of the world. Consider one obvious social construction, language. As the linguistic anthropologist
hearn (2012, p. 8) argues, a widely held but mistaken view of language is that it is “largely a set of labels that can be placed
n pre-existing concepts, objects, or relationships.” According to an alternative hypothesis, the Whorf hypothesis (Whorf,
956 [1941]), language creates categories, and the categories inﬂuence cognition: “the dramatically different sorts of things
o which languages require their speakers to pay attention have been found to have an inﬂuence on thought” (Ahearn, p. 83).
he semantic domain of color gives well-studied examples. The Russian language has distinct and commonly used words
or light blues, goluboy, and dark blues, siniy. Winawer et al. (2007) ﬁnd that this gives native Russian speakers an advantage
ver native English speakers in discriminating between colors at the goluboy/siniy boundary (e.g. one goluboy and one siniy).
articipants in an experiment performed a task of color differentiation that did not involve language and was too brief to give
hem time to access the color terms. Nonetheless, language mattered. Native Russian speakers were faster than non-native
40 The causal impact is based on the arguably random timing when different parts of Brazil obtained access to the TV emissions. There was, however, no
irect  test available of a change in mental models. Similarly, a study in the US by Kearney and Levine (2015) used historical MTV ratings to show that MTV’s
6  and Pregnant, a US reality TV show, caused a 4.3% reduction in teen births.
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speakers at distinguishing colors at the goluboy/siniy boundary, but not at colors that were not at this boundary. The results
suggest that language in the color domain affects the perception of colors.41
5.4. Race and caste as social constructions
While language is an obvious social construction, many social identities, such as race and caste, are also social construc-
tions. In societies in which race is not viewed as a salient characteristic, it may  in fact not be. But race may  affect behavior
when people come to see individuals (both others and themselves) through the lens of race. When this happens, a category
like race that would contain no relevant information in a situation in which race is not viewed as a salient category becomes
relevant and may  carry meanings.42
Socially constructed ﬁctions can thus be self-fulﬁlling. In an experiment in India, when high- and low-caste boys played
a game in which they received rewards for every maze they solved, there was no performance difference between the caste
groups until caste identity was primed (Hoff and Pandey, 2006, 2014). When caste was  made salient in mixed-caste settings,
a performance gap of almost a quarter emerged between the high- and low-caste boys in favor of the high-caste boys.
(Participants worked on the mazes on paper packets that were assessed anonymously. Thus a caste bias by the grader could
not have inﬂuenced the measure of performance.)
There are social constructions that can be totally artiﬁcial; ex post they reinforce the interests of one group or another.
Because they are artiﬁcial constructions, they can be changed. Section 5.2 gave examples of some constructions that were
changed by government policy interventions and by media; Section 5.7 gives an example of a construction of gender roles
that was changed by an increase in the demand for women in the workforce.
5.5. Social multipliers and the interdependence of beliefs
There is good reason that our perceptions are affected by those of others. We  each have only limited information and
limited capabilities to process information. Few of us have the ability to evaluate the scientiﬁc evidence on global warming,
for example. We  delegate that responsibility to others. We trust that they will honestly do that task—or at least most of us
do so.43,44
Appendix B provides a simple model in which there is belief interdependence.45 The important consequence is that there
can be a multiplier effect on beliefs—a change in information that leads to a change in one individual’s beliefs is ampliﬁed as
others in society change their beliefs. Any individual may  not know why others have changed their beliefs; he simply takes
their change in beliefs as new data to be processed, which reinforces the initial change in beliefs.
Behavior can change in response to the change in beliefs. The observed consequences of the changes in behavior are also
new data, which typically will be reinforcing. Thus, political leaders often talk about conﬁdence multipliers: if we  can only
create a mood of conﬁdence, there will be more investment, which will justify and amplify the increase in conﬁdence.46
The model of Appendix B describes the contagion of beliefs about a very particular subject, the probability of the
occurrence of an event. But the same process is at play in the contagion of values and even preferences.
What makes this particularly relevant are intertemporal linkages. For instance, if being primed for other-regarding behav-
ior at time t makes it easier to be primed for such behavior at later dates (or results in the individual’s making choices that
increase the probability that he will be primed for such behavior), then those from one society will appear to be different
(that is, in a given context, they will make different choices) from those from other societies.5.6. Information processing, social reinforcement, and social divisions
The assumption in the previous sections that we  do not choose our culture, and that our culture shapes us, is perhaps too
extreme. We do not choose the society into which we  are born, but we  might be able to choose the subgroups with which we
41 Language embeds culturally the needs of a society to respond to its physical circumstances. For instance, Crusoe and Friday would have developed
words  to communicate subtle differences in weather. Once the language is developed, it would reinforce how individuals see the environment.
42 Hoff and Stiglitz (2010) construct simple models showing that this is the case. See also Appendix C.
43 The scientiﬁc community does not rely just on trust, but on veriﬁcation (which might be thought of as the opposite of trust). Norms requiring the
disclosure of data and methodology enable veriﬁcation. Still, most people have to rely that others have performed the requisite veriﬁcation.
44 We have thus far used trust in a broad sense. In the “multiple identities” model that we employed in earlier sections of this paper, different identities
trust  in different things: Some may  be more faith-based: “In God we trust”; others may correspond to the “enlightenment identity,” trusting in the “scientiﬁc
process.” Which identity the individual adopts can be socially determined. There is a subgroup in the US population that has come not to trust in the scientiﬁc
process and to doubt the validity of climate science. Most individuals do not have the ability to verify whether or not the claims of the scientiﬁc community
(say  as reﬂected in the IPCC reports) are accurate. They rely on others, and their beliefs are subject to conﬁrmatory bias. When they hear evidence that one
small  aspect of a study is ﬂawed, they may  see that as evidence that the entire study is ﬂawed. As we note below, those beliefs are then reinforced. There
is  a culture of “climate-change deniers.”
45 Belief interdependence also arises in models of common knowledge, in which beliefs converge. Here, beliefs do not in general converge.
46 But, of course, beliefs are eventually tested against reality, even if ﬁltered through a distorted lens with conﬁrmatory bias. Even when there is a social
multiplier, the green shoots of spring 2009 that had withered by the summer almost surely eroded conﬁdence in the economic ofﬁcials who had touted
them  as signs of an incipient robust recovery. See Akerlof and Shiller (2009).
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ssociate. Like the media to which we are exposed, our subgroups play a role in shaping our beliefs, values, and perceptions
Haidt et al., 1993).
But even then, the structure of society (which the individual does not choose) affects the extent to which different
ubgroups come into contact with each other and, when they do, the extent to which people in one group give credibility to
he beliefs of those in other groups.47 If we believe that others’ circumstances and interests are distinctly different from, or
pposed to, ours, then we are less likely to give the others credibility, so that any exchange of beliefs is less likely to give rise
o convergence in beliefs. Societies that are more divided (in income, ethnicity, etc.) are more likely to end up with divisions
n beliefs (and less trust in each other), making cooperative behavior more difﬁcult; and indeed, making interactions less
requent, partly because the interactions may  prove less pleasurable.
Whether we give weight to the beliefs of particular individuals and groups is at least partly culturally determined—affected
y the beliefs of the groups with which we identify and whose beliefs we trust.
As we have noted, cultural and political outlooks affect how individuals interpret data. One of the most strongly estab-
ished psychological biases is conﬁrmatory bias. Earlier studies of conﬁrmatory bias simply tested the extent to which prior
eliefs affected the interpretation of data. Where those prior beliefs came from was  not of concern. Here, we  simply note that
o a large extent, those prior beliefs are culturally determined. Different cultures come to believe different things—and they
elieve that the evidence supports their beliefs. As Hoff and Stiglitz (2010) emphasize, there can be, as a result, equilibrium
ctions: different beliefs among different groups can be sustained, even though the groups are confronted repeatedly by
vidence that would undermine the differences if the individuals were rational, autonomous actors (Appendix C).
In an experiment by Kahan et al. (2013), individuals were presented with identical data in two different contexts and
hen were asked which hypothesis the data supported. One context was ideologically and politically neutral: the hypothesis
oncerned which of two skin creams was more effective. The second context was ideologically and politically charged: the
ypothesis concerned whether gun control reduced crime. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the two contexts.
n pre-play tests, the study assessed the numeracy of the respondents, as well as their cultural and ideological outlooks. As
ight be expected, in the case of the skin-cream frame, the greater the respondent’s numeracy, the greater the probability
e interpreted the data correctly. The probability was not affected by his cultural and political outlooks. In contrast, in the
ase of the gun-control frame, a respondent was more likely to interpret the data correctly when the correct interpretation
orresponded to his ideological and political views. Moreover, when the correct answer in the gun-control frame supported
is ideological beliefs, numeracy helped (boosting the odds of getting the answer right). But when the correct answer was
nconsistent with the respondent’s ideology, numeracy had little impact. The results support a very general ﬁnding that on
opics that are important for social and political identity, individuals tend to engage in motivated reasoning—the tendency
o arrive at conclusions they like, no matter what their level of numeracy.48
.7. Role model effects
As emphasized throughout this paper, how individuals see the world depends on the lenses through which they view
t; and they do not, in general, choose the lenses.49,50 For instance, comments of women in interviews in India provide
uggestive evidence of the inﬂuence of prevailing patterns in society on attitudes towards educating girls. When asked why
heir daughters never went to school, some parents merely said that “girls don’t go to school in our community.” When
arents in Kerala, a socially progressive state, were asked why they sent their children to school, some did not know what
o say because they took it as self-evident that going to school was  what children do (PROBE, 1999).
This subsection develops a simple model that illustrates the idea that associated with different social patterns in society
re different ways of seeing the world. The model is a special case of the model of perceptions in Eqs. (5.1)–(5.3). The focus
f the model is the demand for educating a daughter.
In the model, there is a continuum of agents, whom we call parents. Each pair of parents has a young daughter. Parents
ave to choose whether or not to educate her. From an uneducated daughter, the parents would get a ﬁxed utility, . Across
ouseholds,  varies. The cumulative distribution function is F().51The parents do not have a unitary “true” utility function. How they think about educating their daughter depends on
he society in which they live. Besides the market-determined lifetime earnings of the daughter, W,  the parents’ attitudes
ome from prevailing social patterns. Consider two  mental models, A and P. Under A, a woman’s autonomy is held in esteem,
47 See, e.g., Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011). Fricker (2007) coins the term “epistemic injustice” for the discounting of the credibility of an individual by
irtue  of his membership in a race or other group whose membership is ﬁxed by his ascriptive characteristics.
48 The main results were replicated in an experiment with randomly selected World Bank staff (World Bank Group, 2015) as well as other development
rofessionals (Gauri et al., 2015). Motivated reasoning is an interpretation of conﬁrmatory bias. It is important to realize that individuals may  not be
onscious of this bias. The persistence of beliefs in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary provides part of the rationale for rejecting the hypothesis
hat  the individuals are just engaged in Bayesian updating. Bayesian statisticians with different priors would of course come up with different posterior
iews  of the world. But as evidence mounts, there should be a convergence of beliefs among individuals with different priors.
49 This is true, even though, through effort, some individuals can alter their own lenses. Our analysis applies so long as most people, most of the time, see
he  world through lenses that are socially acquired and socially activated. Our results apply even though most people imagine that they see the world in
n  unmediated, veridical way (Fiske and Taylor, 2013, p. 105).
50 See Douglas (1986), D’Andrade (1995), and DiMaggio (1997).
51 In general, this would depend on economic and social variables, but we  abstract from that for simplicity.
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and an educated daughter is a source of pride to her parents. Under P, an educated daughter is a threat to the patriarchal
social order and to men’s masculinity. Parents’ utility from an educated daughter depends on the salience of each of the two
mental models. Let U be a weighted sum,
U = ω(s)VA + [1 − ω(s)]VP + W (5.4)
where s is the salience of the mental model A and VA is the parents’ intrinsic valuation of an educated daughter under mental
model A, and similarly for VP. Reﬂecting the earlier discussion of Indian villagers’ attitudes towards educating girls, let s be
the fraction of the population in the community that educates their daughters. The weight ω and thus U are increasing in s.
If all households educate daughters, ω = 1. If none do, ω = 0.
For given s, at an interior equilibrium the marginal uneducated girl will give her parents utility ˆ:
ˆ = ω(s)VA + [1 − ω(s)]VP + W,  (5.5)
which states that the parents are indifferent between educating her or not.
The evolution of the fraction of educated girls closes the model. We  focus on the long run. A long-run interior equilibrium
is a fraction of daughters that are educated, s*, that solves
ˆ = ω(s∗)VA + [1 − ω(s∗)]VP + W,  (5.6)
and
s∗ = F(ˆ) (5.7)
since only if  < ˆ do parents choose to educate their daughter.
The top panel of Fig. 3 shows how the utility from educating a daughter increases in the fraction of daughters in the
community who are educated. It slopes up because it is socially determined by the fraction of girls who are educated, which
increases the weight . (The slope is ω′(s)[VA − VP].)
The second panel shows the distribution of parents’ utility across households from an uneducated daughter. This value
varies over the population of parents by assumption. For instance, some parents have greater need than others for a young
child to work at home to tend to an infant or a sick grandmother. The ﬁgure assumes a roughly normal distribution of .
The bottom panel superimposes the two graphs. In this example, there are two stable equilibria (the solid circles) and one
unstable equilibrium between them. In the “bad” equilibrium, the environment has no educated girls and the patriarchal
mental model is so salient that no parents want to educate their daughters. In the “good” equilibrium, a high fraction
of daughters is educated, which makes mental model A salient, which increases the parents’ preferences for educating a
daughter. This leads most households to prefer to educate their daughters.
A testable prediction of the model is that an exogenous increase in women’s job opportunities–an increase in expected
lifetime earnings from W to W′—can lead to a large increase in the fraction of daughters who  are educated. Fig. 4 illustrates
this. In the ﬁgure, there are initially two stable equilibria—the bad equilibrium with no daughters educated and the good
equilibrium with most daughters educated. An increase in W shifts up the parents’ utility curve (U) of having an educated
daughter. As the number of daughters who are educated increases, parents’ preferences change. The rightward movement
along the U-curve is so large that the new, unique equilibrium entails nearly universal education of girls.
The prediction of a large shift in behavior as a result of a small shift in the expected lifetime earnings to an educated
daughter was borne out in a ﬁeld experiment in India (Jensen, 2012). Jensen sent call center recruiters to a randomly
selected set of villages that had never been served by job center recruiters. The recruiters helped young women in the vil-
lages obtain call center jobs. In the treatment villages compared to the control villagers, there was a 4.6 percentage point
increase in the probability that a young woman would obtain a call center job. Although the expected wealth effect was
very small, it substantially changed how households treated daughters. Compared to girls in the control villages, girls in
the treatment villages were more likely to be enrolled in school. For young girls, 30–40% of the gap in body mass index
with wealthy Delhi residents was closed three years after the experiment. Jensen argues that the changes in parents’ behav-
ior are too large to be plausibly explained within a model in which parents have ﬁxed preferences. Instead, a plausible
interpretation, depicted in Fig. 4, is that the shift up in job opportunities (the increase in W)  increased the salience of the
mental model in which a girl’s autonomy and education had intrinsic value. The increase in the weight on mental model
A rather than P enhanced the effect of the increased job opportunities on parents’ decisions to educate and invest in their
daughters.
Fig. 5 shows the striking contrast between the model with endogenous preferences and a model with ﬁxed preferences.
With ﬁxed preferences, the increase in an educated girl’s expected earnings, W,  brings about only a small increase in the
fraction of parents who choose to educate their daughters.
The shift with endogenous preferences, depicted above in Fig. 4, illustrates a phenomenon described by DiMaggio (1997)
in this way: “large-scale cultural changes may  be caused by large-scale, more or less simultaneous frame switches by many
interdependent actors” (p. 280).In very different contexts, other studies ﬁnd evidence that exposure to new social patterns changes individual preferences
and suggests that exposure also changes perception. In Pakistan, the government uses a lottery to allocate visas to applicants
who seek to participate in the Hajj. At the Hajj, Muslims from over 100 countries gather in Mecca, communally performing
rituals. Utilizing the random choice of Pakistani lottery winners, Clingingsmith et al. (2009) show that, for both male and
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emale Pakistanis, participation in the Hajj changed attitudes. Despite the fact that pilgrims’ social roles did not change
pon their return home, the experience led to greater acceptance of female education and female employment, a more
ositive view of women’s abilities, and greater concern about crimes against women  in Pakistan. The effects were larger
or those travelling in smaller groups, as predicted by the theory that the effects depend on relative exposure to new role
odels.
Even exposure to role models in ﬁction, such as in serial drama, can change preferences and behavior, as we  noted in
ection 5.2.3.
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5.8. Ecology, society, and individual cognition
A large literature in psychology investigates how ecological conditions,  giving rise to the growing of particular crops
entailing particular degrees of cooperation, affect behavior and cognition, e.g., whether individuals think holistically (focusing
on context) or analytically (focusing on the features of individual objects in isolation). Obviously, individuals who think in
ways that are markedly different, and who observe the world very differently, will behave differently, taking different actions
when exposed to the same choice set.
The Yangtze River in China divides areas that have traditionally farmed mostly rice from areas that have farmed mostly
wheat. The same dynasties have ruled over the rice and wheat regions for most of the past few thousands of years, but
the ecology and social patterns have been very different in the two  regions. Rice farmers have to cooperate intensively.
Cooperation is required to build irrigation systems, coordinate the use of water, and manage the dredging and draining of
the systems. Since transplanting and harvesting rice needs to be done in a short window of time, rice farmers tend to form
cooperative labor exchange and coordinate their planting dates to allow them to help out in each other’s ﬁelds. In contrast,
wheat does not need to be irrigated. Planting and harvesting wheat impose a relatively light labor burden, so that most
wheat farmers can look after their own plots without relying on their neighbors.
Do the large differences in social organization lead to large differences in the mental models that individuals use? The
next two subsections conﬁrm that that is the case.5.8.1. Mental models
To test the hypothesis of a causal link from ecology to psychology and to assess the role of mental models, Talhelm et al.
(2014) conducted psychological tests on Han Chinese students in universities spread across China. From a set of three items,
the students were asked to choose which two items should be paired. (The test is called a triad test) Examples of triads were
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train, bus, track} and {dog, rabbit, carrots}; see Fig. 6, left panel. In each triad, two  of the items belong to the same abstract
ategory, such as vehicle or animal, and two share a functional relationship: trains run on tracks, and rabbits eat carrots. The
esearchers found that the subjects who were from rice culture were more likely to categorize pairs with reference to the
nteractions between elements of the triad, whereas the subjects from wheat culture were more likely to categorize pairs
ith reference to abstract principles applying to the individual items of the triad. The same results hold when samples were
imited to border areas of the Yangtze River. This implies that the results cannot be explained by omitted variables.
The results continued to hold when instead of the crops grown in the subject’s region, an instrumental variable of
cological conditions was  used to predict the production levels of rice and wheat in a region. This removes concerns that a
ore holistic psychology might cause more rice-growing, or that a third variable might cause both holism and rice-growing.
.8.2. Individualism
The study in China also assessed how the perceived importance of the self relative to that of one’s close associates
epended on the social conditions, driven, as we have suggested, by differences in ecology. The assessment used the sociogram
ask, in which participants draw a diagram of their social network using circles to represent the self and others. A measure
f individualism is how large participants draw the self compared to how large they draw the others. Earlier research found
hat Americans draw themselves about 6 mm  bigger than they draw others, Europeans draw themselves 3.5 mm bigger, and
apanese draw themselves slightly smaller than others (Kitayama et al., 2009). The ﬁnding in the China study was  that people
rom the rice culture drew the circle of themselves slightly smaller (−0.20 mm)  than the circles of their close associates (that
s, they deﬂated the self relative to others), while people from wheat provinces self-inﬂated by 1.5 mm (Talhelm et al., 2014).
ee Fig. 6, right panel.
Other studies have conﬁrmed these differences in cognition. East Asians, in general, are more holistic in their thinking
han Westerners (a literature review is Nisbett and Masuda, 2003). Experimental subjects were asked to explain outcomes
n sports and the movement of animate and inanimate objects. The East Asians were more likely to explain the events with
eference to interactions between the object and the ﬁeld—external, contextual, and historical factors. The Americans, in
ontrast, were more likely to explain the same events by reference to presumed traits, abilities, and other characteristics of
he individual.
Not surprisingly, there are behavioral consequences to these differences in cognition. The study comparing the rice and
heat cultures of China, as well as a cross-country study (Lester, 1995), ﬁnd that individualistic cultures have higher divorce
ates (controlling for GDP per capita). In China, the wheat provinces had a 50% higher divorce rate than the rice provinces
n 1996. Despite the near doubling of the divorce rate in China in the past 15 years, the raw divorce rate gap between the
heat and rice provinces remained the same in 2000 and 2010..9. Brain activity
So far, we have identiﬁed fundamental differences in cognition—in holism versus analytical thinking and in
ndividualism—across cultures. Such differences are also reﬂected in observed brain activity: there are neurological
48 K. Hoff, J.E. Stiglitz / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 126 (2016) 25–57Fig. 7. Still photo from underwater vignette (left panel), and focal ﬁsh against different backgrounds (right panel).
Source: Masuda and Nisbett (2001).
differences between East Asians and Westerners. For instance, a universal human feature is to engage a particular part of
the brain (the medial prefrontal cortex, or mPFC) while thinking about the self (see references in Kitayama and Park, 2010,
p. 115). But the Chinese, in contrast to Westerners, also engage the mPFC when they think about others in their social
network. Among Chinese, the mPFC is strongly engaged when one’s mother is thought about.
5.9.1. Attention and perception
Until recently, it was believed that the basic mechanisms of perceptual processing were innate.52 Even this has now
been proven wrong. The social environment shapes the way individuals decode their visual environment, guiding attention,
perception, and memory (Nisbett et al., 2001). Asians attend more to the ﬁeld of view, and Westerners attend more to salient
objects within the ﬁeld. An experiment presented 20-s videos of underwater scenes to Japanese and American participants
(Masuda and Nisbett, 2001). Fig. 7 shows a still photo from one of the videos. After seeing ten videos, participants were
presented with still photos of objects they had seen before and also objects they had not seen before. The previously seen
objects were shown in one of three ways: (i) against the original background, (ii) against no background, or (iii) against a
novel background, as shown in the right panel of the ﬁgure. The Japanese participants were thrown off by presentation of the
object against the novel ﬁeld. They made substantially more errors when the object was  seen against a novel background than
when it was seen against the original background. In contrast, the background manipulation did not affect the performance
of the American participants.
5.9.2. Culture, behavior, and the brain
From what we have said so far, it is clear that culture has physiological consequences. There are physical, including
neurological, bases underlying the differences described above. Chua et al. (2005) examined the eye movements of US  and
East Asian participants looking at images with a focal object imposed on a complex background. Compared to the East Asians,
the US participants focused on, and looked more quickly at, the focal objects in their visual arena. The East Asians made
more quick glances to the background.
The observed physiological differences, too, can be linked to brain activity. In a study using functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), the neural processes that underpin these differences were identiﬁed. Compared to East Asian participants,
US participants activated more regions in the brain implicated in object processing (Gutchess et al., 2006).
5.9.3. The plasticity of the brain
Thus, the metaphorical distinction often made between hardware (the brain) and software (culture) may  be less rigid
than the standard vocabulary suggests. The brain itself and the way it operates can be altered by experience. That this is
so has long been suspected, but advances in neuroscience are conﬁrming this. Consider cab-driving in London. It requires
continuously retrieving episodic memories of a busy complex city, simulating possible routes, and operating on maps. The
drivers make constant use of the navigating functions of their hippocampi (Maguire et al., 2006). As a result, the shape of
their hippocampi systematically differs from the shape in non-cab drivers. The longer the cab drivers have been driving, the
larger the differences are. The act of driving, self-motion from riding in a car, or preexisting individual differences at the
time of career choice cannot explain the differences in the hippocampi.The example of cab drivers sheds light on human malleability more generally. The routines and habits that people engage
in are not randomly distributed across the world. Instead, they emerge from historical experience and are organized by
social factors. Just as taxi drivers regularly perform certain tasks (retrieving relevant episodic memories, simulating possible
52 Locke (1955) uses the metaphor “white paper void of all characters” to describe the mind.
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outes, and operating on the mental maps), so too do people in different cultures. Sustained engagement in tasks yields
ulturally patterned neural activities (Kitayama and Park, 2010, p 114); the mind can become “re-tooled” (Wilson, 2010).
.9.4. Implications for standard economics
The ﬁndings that culture and experience affect cognition, individualism, attention, and perception have an immediate
conomic implication: the standard assumption in economics of intertemporal separability is misleading. What happens at
ne date affects behavior and perceptions at later dates. Experiences affect cognition. Experiences that the subjects have
ad in their lives affect the accuracy with which their brains respond even to very simple tasks, for example, estimating the
bsolute compared to the relative lengths of lines in the framed-line test (Kityama et al., 2003). As the psychologist Heine
2012, p. 9) writes, “mind and culture cannot be disentangled; the mind is shaped by its experiences, and cultures differ in
he kinds of experiences that they provide.” Culture (experience) affects how experiences are experienced.
. Social dynamics and rigidities
.1. Societal rigidities
One implication of the social determinants of preferences and cognition, with each individual’s beliefs and behavior
ependent on those of others, is that societal rigidities can emerge. Conﬁrmatory bias and the dependence of behavior on
erceptions can contribute further to societal rigidities.
For example, the caste system need not be enforced by punishment in a repeated game (as in Abreu, 1988) or not only
y such mechanisms. Individuals in all positions may  come to believe that there is something fundamentally “right” about
he system. If outcomes of failure by those who deviate from their assigned roles are more salient than successes (as a result
f conﬁrmatory bias), individuals will come to believe that it is best for them to act in accordance with the norm. If, as Hoff
nd Pandey (2006, 2014) and Hoff et al. (2011) show, performance and group solidarity are affected by the stigma of being
f low Indian caste, then beliefs about the caste order can be self-conﬁrming. Each individual may believe that it is optimal
or him or her to play the role assigned by the system, and there can be broad consensus in society that the social order is
ppropriate.
In older times (and even today in some quarters), the belief systems that categorized and ranked individuals by race or
aste or ethnicity were reinforced by ideology (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2010). The ideology may  be that the social order is ordained
y God or that it is efﬁcient, with differences in well-being reﬂecting differences in social contributions. There is always
ncertainty about social change, and with enough uncertainty—belief about which can be socially engendered by elites
ho would be the likely losers from a change—and enough risk aversion, the change in the social order may  actually seem
ndesirable. It might seem that changes to that order would impose huge costs that would not be justiﬁed by the expected
eneﬁts.
While it is easy for those in the West to look at the caste system as an example of societal rigidity, there are examples in
he West as well. Consider the overwhelming evidence on climate change. A large subgroup of the US population (a recent
stimate is 35%) has created a belief system that there is not solid evidence that the Earth is warming.53 Change to halt global
arming requires collective action. Given the opposition of this group, the action that is required is not (so far) forthcoming.
iven the strength of their prior beliefs, additional evidence seems to have little bearing on the climate change skeptics’
eliefs.54
Another source of societal rigidity can be a low level of trust. Appendix A shows that an economy can be characterized
y multiple equilibria with respect to trust and trustworthiness, arising from differences in socially determined preferences
nd beliefs and not, as in Section 2.3, from differences in social capital, i.e., payoffs in the context of a repeated game. In the
rust equilibrium in the appendix, the lack of trust can fundamentally change the individual. The identity that is elicited (or
rimed) in the no-trust equilibrium is different from the one that is primed in the trust equilibrium. While the “trustworthy”
ndividual that is primed in his direct interactions with others could be justiﬁed as part of a rational Bayesian equilibrium
it is optimal for him to act in a trustworthy way in interactions with other trustworthy individuals, but to act in a selﬁsh
nd opportunistic way if he believes he is interacting with non-trustworthy people), his trustworthy mode of interaction
arries over into other interactions. He behaves, more generally, in a trustworthy way.In principle, in models of trust based on repeated games, it is possible to engineer a shift from a no-trust equilibrium to
 trust equilibrium. There is no lingering effect on “fundamentals” of the episode in which the economy seemed stuck in a
o-trust equilibrium. In contrast, in models of trust based on priming identity, once the no-trust identity is primed, it may  be
ifﬁcult to put the genie back into the bottle. Personalities are shaped. Behavior patterns get entrenched and are passed on
53 Pew Research Center (2014), Section 7.
54 It is increasingly difﬁcult for the climate change deniers to hold onto their position. Even then, evidence that climate is changing does not answer the
uestion of the cause, the extent to which it is the result of human behavior. But one doesn’t have to answer that question to frame a policy response:
eductions in carbon emissions could still be the best way of preventing the untoward events that would otherwise occur.
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across generations. History matters.55 For instance, the lack of trust that characterized the Soviet Union has had long-term
effects on the functioning of society in the post-Soviet era.56
6.2. Social change: a simple mathematical model
There are, of course, important historical instances in which nonetheless, large societal changes in the level of trust
occurred: There was little trust between workers and management in Japan in the 1920s, but this seemed to have changed
in the post-World War  II era. Understanding how one moves from one social equilibrium to another (in this case from a
low-trust equilibrium to another)—in spite of the forces for societal rigidity that we have described—is one of the important
areas of ongoing research. Here, we describe some aspects of that process.
Consider a slight variant of the model introduced earlier with perception, P:
at = H(pt; P(at−1, S, t)) + ut. (6.1)
There are idiosyncratic shocks to perceptions, denoted, t, and to behavior, denoted ut. In such a world, even with sym-
metrically identical (similar) individuals, different individuals will take different (but similar) actions. We can assess social
stability (rigidity) by looking at some aggregate measure, such as the average value of a, denoted a¯.  If the population is large,
then in the long run a¯ changes little if the variances of t + ut are small. If the variance of a¯ is small, then we  can say that the
system exhibits societal stability (rigidity).
We  noted earlier that there can be multiple equilibria. With large enough disturbances, the system can move from one
equilibrium to another. Each can have a domain of attraction.
Policy can induce a change in equilibrium in two ways. First, certain actions may  be forbidden. The individual, in max-
imizing his utility subject to his budget constraints, may be constrained from certain actions (e.g., discriminating against
African-Americans). That may  change his actions and those of others and move society to a different social equilibrium. Note
that once the society has moved to the new equilibrium, it may  be stable: there may  be no need for continued enforcement
actions (Stiglitz, 1973, 1974).
The second way that policy can change the equilibrium is by exposing individuals to new situations and role models,
e.g., through soap operas, that change their perceptions and self-image. Again, a self-sustaining new equilibrium can be
established. (These ideas were explored in the World Development Report 2015.) Behavioral change therapies try to foster
behavioral change by practice in overcoming automatic “fast” decision-making with deliberate “slow” reﬂection. RCTs of
behavioral change therapy with at-risk Chicago adolescents and criminally engaged Liberian men  reduced their anti-social
behavior and criminal activity (Blattman et al. 2015, Heller et al. 2015).
6.3. The internal logic of beliefs
Beliefs can have a dynamic of their own. Changes in ideologies can lead to a change in perceptions and beliefs. Once the
doctrine that “all men  are created equal” came to be accepted as part of the American ideology, there was  a logic (resisted,
admittedly by many) that extended these notions of equality to African-Americans and women. That logic could, and did,
come into conﬂict with interests. There were some individuals for whom the logic was trumped by self-interest; others
for whom it was not. But the willingness of some to sacriﬁce self-interest, as normally understood, for principles and the
well-being of others is testimony to the limitations of economists’ standard model.57
7. Normative considerations and policy
Importing psychological, sociological, and anthropological insights into economists’ conception of preferences and cog-
nition provides additional tools for changing behavior—beyond the economists’ usual toolkit. At the same time, the analysis
provides cautions about how difﬁcult it is to anticipate behavioral effects of policies when those policies change societal
perceptions and norms. Thus, the change in primary school enrollment of girls in Uganda after the elimination of school fees
was far greater than predicted by standard econometric models because it appears to have induced a change in norms: for
parents not to take advantage of the free education offered to their daughters came to be viewed as wrong,  whereas before,
parents were perceived to make reasonable choices in economizing scarce family resources.
Our analysis also provides insights into political battles about framing. For example, is inequality the result of impersonal
competitive market forces or of political choices and economic rent-seeking? Is it efﬁcient or not, exploitative or not? The
55 See Nunn (2008), Durante (2010), Algan and Cahuc (2010), and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
56 Of course, even in the simplest economic models, there can be strong intertemporal linkages. In the models presented earlier in this paper, prior
experiences (consumption) affect current preferences. Interlinkages are absent only with strong assumptions of intertemporal separability. So too, there
can  be intertemporal linkages arising from beliefs that adapt slowly. As long as the memory of, say, banks’ bad behavior remains, there will be a lack of
trust.  In our model in Appendix A, a lack of trust induces the agents to behave in an untrustworthy way, reinforcing pre-existing beliefs.
57 Of course, Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments took a much broader view of human motivation and human nature than that taken by those
who  claim to be his modern-day descendants.
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olitical battles, even when the challengers to the system fail to achieve their political goals, can have societal consequences
ecause they may  change the perceptions of large subgroups of the population.
“Culture”—which following DiMaggio (1997) is the mental models learned from society and cued by the context and
n which people draw to conceptualize—has effects like public goods or bads. Externalities are pervasive. Sandel (2012)
as noted that converting certain transactions into market transactions58 encourages the expression of the selﬁsh self and
orrupts the social relationship. The conversion denigrates the value of the transaction. Because the values associated with
ertain actions are socially determined, there are consequences even for individuals who  have not converted the transactions
f the given type into market transactions.
Our well-being depends not just on the goods we consume, but is deeply affected by our relationship with others. Take
he issue of trust. Trust is a social phenomenon. Economists have begun to recognize its implications for standard economics:
conomic performance in a low-trust equilibrium is lower, in general, than in a high-trust equilibrium (Algan and Cahuc,
010). But there is a difference between living in a high- and a low-trust society that is more fundamental than the gap in
he efﬁciency of production and exchange. Trust inﬂuences not only our behavior but also our well-being. Holding the goods
nd services provided in a transaction constant, interactions without trust give rise to anxiety and a loss of well-being, at
east for many (if not most) individuals.59
Because of these pervasive externalities, there is no presumption that the equilibria that arise in the models we have
xplored have any optimality properties. Hoff and Stiglitz (2010) explore one example—the use of racial or caste constructs,
hich clearly did not serve the interests of large segments of society.60
While the contribution of this work to positive economics should be clear, it poses difﬁcult, well-known normative
uestions. Standard welfare economics evaluates alternative economic policies assuming individuals with well-speciﬁed
tility functions. When utility functions can change as a result of policy, which utility function should be used? (Similar
roblems arise even in conventional settings: when individuals maximize expected utility, where the subjective probabilities
f different events can change, it is as if the utility function changes. Do we use the ex ante utility function–say based on very
ncomplete information–or the ex post one?)
The models force us to ask, what do we mean by a good society? Assume, for instance, that there were a social evolution
hat led to an equilibrium in which our selﬁsh self, rather than our other-regarding self, was  the only one that manifested
tself. Could we be non-judgmental about the desirability of such an equilibrium in comparison with one that was  more
alanced? In posing the question this way, we are going beyond the instrumental view of economic policy.
. Conclusion
The taxonomy of social determinants of preferences, perception, and cognition that we have discussed provides expla-
ations and predictions that are different both from those provided by conventional economics and from much of the work
n behavioral economics, with its focus on individuals in isolation and with its insights derived primarily from cognitive
sychology. People are social animals. It should not be surprising that the social environment affects preferences, percep-
ion, and cognition and, thus, not only choice sets but also how people make choices. While it is obvious that many aspects
f life (the many manifestations of altruism, love, civic-mindedness, spite, etc.) are not well explained by economic mod-
ls despite valiant attempts to do so,61 we hope that we have persuaded the reader that important aspects of economic
ehavior can best be understood through models in which an individual’s interactions with others are at the core of the
heory explaining not only choice sets but also the way the individual makes choices. Moreover, behavior is affected not just
y the social context at the moment of decision. There is a deeper sense in which social context affects preferences, perception,
nd cognition.
We  have emphasized, in particular, how culture and social context shape how the individual perceives the world, the
ens through which he sees it, and the categories that he uses to understand and interpret it. This can give rise to multiple
quilibria and societal rigidities.
Societies can get trapped into dysfunctional norms and behavior patterns. It is possible to change norms and to prime iden-
ities and mental models that change behavior. The World Development Report 2015 provides dramatic examples. They include
any to which we have referred here: using lockable boxes with savings books in order to increase individuals’ ability to act
n their intentions to save for preventative health products; exposing individuals to soap operas with female characters with
mall families, which reduced birth rates; and using political reservations to expose villagers to local women leaders—thereby
liminating or reducing gender bias in evaluations of leaders and in parents’ aspirations for their teenage children.We have shown that there is a wealth of evidence for behavioral changes—both natural and laboratory experiments—that
s hard to reconcile within the model of the individual in standard economics (the rational actor model with ﬁxed preferen-
es), but which is consistent with our models of endogenous preferences and socially determined cognition.
58 This is illustrated by the example of the Israeli child-care center described earlier.
59 This is just another example where well-being is not captured by GDP. See Stiglitz et al. (2009).
60 They suggest that the use of race as an important categorization is historically relatively recent; there were societal equilibria in US history in which
uch  categories were not used.
61 Much of the work in what is sometimes thought of as “economic imperialism” shows that price effects matter even when there are non-economic
otivations. Establishing this may  still leave unexplained much of the variability in behavior.
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Conventional economics provides a lens through which one can see the world, including human interactions. It stresses
the importance of ﬁnancial incentives and largely denies the relevance of altruism for understanding markets. By assuming
that preferences are ﬁxed, it assumes that policy interventions (including providing ﬁnancial incentives) will not alter the
nature of the individual, his identity, and his perception of others. Of course, well-trained economists do not deny the
existence of these other effects, but suggest that they are the province of other social sciences.62 This view of the world
is itself a social construct—one that serves some interests but may  have had adverse effects on others and on society as a
whole. This worldview helps frame how we think about economic decisions and about society more broadly.
One central insight of behavioral economics is that framing matters. It affects individual behavior, collective decision-
making, and the evolution of beliefs and culture. The standard economics framing of individuals and the determinants of
their behavior has had profound effects on economic and social policy and the evolution of many societies.
Ideologies are often contested. In the last few years, the framing provided by conventional economics has become increas-
ingly contested and the subject of debate. This paper can be viewed as a contribution to that debate. It is about the proper
balance between social and non-social determinants of behavior (endowments, technology, and incentives).
The ability of so many to ignore the social determinants of behavior, in spite of the wealth of evidence for them, is
testimony to the importance of two of the concepts presented here—mental models and conﬁrmatory bias. The irrational
devotion to the model of rationality provides further cause for skepticism about rationality. As this paper and the rich
literature upon which it draws argue, there are alternative models of human behavior, with markedly different implications
for how economic systems function. Economic research on the social determinants of preferences, perception, cognition
and, thus, behavior is still young. The rapidly growing body of work suggests the fruitfulness of more realistic models of
human behavior for explaining outcomes and designing policies.
Appendix A. The effect of trust on trustworthiness
This appendix shows that it is easy to construct a model in which there is an equilibrium exhibiting a high level of trust,
and another equilibrium with a low level of trust. Three hypotheses underlie the analysis:
(i) When individual i interacts with individual j, whether i trusts j affects how i behaves.
(ii) What i does may  elicit either trustworthy or untrustworthy behavior. Thus j’s behavior is (in part) a consequence of i’s
behavior, which in turn depends on i’s beliefs.
(iii) Beliefs are, at least in part, social constructions. If others believe that, in general, people are trustworthy, individual i will
believe that, too; if others believe that most people are untrustworthy, so will individual i. The collective experience is
greater than the individual experience. That’s why the collective wisdom is given such weight.
In the model presented here (a variant of Hoff and Stiglitz, 2004), individuals have a choice: they can take the trustworthy
action (dealing honestly with one’s trading partner), or the untrustworthy action (dealing dishonestly). One randomly meets
trading partners, has no knowledge of their trustworthiness, but has beliefs based on a given set of societal beliefs of the
fraction of trustworthy people, x (or more accurately, the fraction of people who  will act in a trustworthy way). One also
has knowledge of one’s previous experience. For simplicity, we assume a one-period memory, and so the expected value of
x is given by xe = B(xs, ),  where xs are societal beliefs about the fraction of people who acted in a trustworthy way  in the
previous period.  is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the individual’s previous encounter is with a trustworthy
person, and 0 otherwise. The individual has to take an action before he knows whether his partner is trustworthy, but ﬁnds
out later whether he is or is not.
Individuals differ in their utility functions, e.g. in the disutility from acting in an untrustworthy way. Some may  actually
get utility from such behavior, but it causes disutility to “good” individuals. There is a distribution of types, , denoted by
F(). A type  individual chooses to act in a trustworthy way or not depending on his beliefs about the likelihood that his
trading partner will act in a trustworthy way. Thus, for any given xe, there is a critical value of 
(xe) ≡ ˆ (A.1)
such that for  ≥ ˆ,  the individual acts in a trustworthy way. Given societal beliefs and the individual’s last period experience,
the fraction of people who will act in a trustworthy way this period is determined.
We need to close the model with an equation describing the evolution of societal beliefs. We  focus on a limiting case in
which individuals give no weight to their own experience. Then a long-run rational expectations social equilibrium is the
solution to (A.1) and
1 − F(ˆ) = x∗ = xe (A.2)
62 The anthropologist Geertz (1973, p. 44) calls this the “stratigraphic approach.” Our conclusion accords with his hypothesis that “we need to replace
the  ‘stratigraphic’ conception of the relations between the various aspects of human existence with a synthetic one; that is, one in which biological,
psychological, sociological, and cultural factors can be treated as variables within unitary systems of analysis.”
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here can, in general, exist multiple equilibria, i.e. multiple values of {x, ˆ} satisfying (A.1) and (A.2). A low equilibrium value
f  means that most people in society act in a trustworthy way—it is a trust society—while a high value means society is
ntrusting. When there are such multiple equilibria, a large shock—undermining even temporarily the level of trust—can
ove the society from a trust society to one in which trust in other people is low.
This analysis assumed that individual preferences were given (individuals differed in a single parameter, , the utility of
ehaving honestly). It focused on how socially determined beliefs affected actions, and therefore beliefs, within a standard
odel. This is an example of what the ﬁnancier George Soros refers to as reﬂexivity,  the idea that beliefs can change the
conomic fundamentals.
The social context can, itself, change preferences—how individuals behave and the choices they make. Many individuals
ave within themselves a selﬁsh and a non-selﬁsh person, a trustworthy and a non-trustworthy person. An environment
n which there is no trust brings out the non-trustworthy identity. The non-trustworthy environment, in effect, lowers the
tility of acting in a trustworthy way. For example, the close supervision of actions that an employer interacting with a
orker takes in a low-trust environment may  elicit behavior in which the worker takes advantage of any lapse of attention
y the supervisor. The distribution function of ˆ is itself a function of the social environment. Thus, the fraction of people
ho act honestly, in (A.2), becomes
1 − F(ˆ, x∗) = x ∗ . (A.3)
t should be apparent that it is even easier to generate multiple equilibria in the fraction of trustworthy people, x*, in the
ociety.
ppendix B. Social interdependence of beliefs
What we believe depends on what others believe. As a result, a change in beliefs by one person can be ampliﬁed throughout
 social network. To be concrete, assume for individual i that his beliefs, pi, about the probability of the occurrence of an
vent are a function of his information and others’ beliefs:
pi = f i(p−i, Ii) (B.1)
he equilibrium set of beliefs is given by pi* satisfying the simultaneous equations for all i:
pi∗ = f i(p−i∗, Ii). (B.2)
t should be evident that the vector of all individuals’ beliefs is
p∗ = (I). (B.3)
he equilibrium beliefs are a function of the aggregate information.
Consider an economy with two individuals. Only individual 1 has access to outside information, but he does not know this.
hen he revises his beliefs as a result of new information, individual 2 will also revise his beliefs. Individual 1 (mistakenly)
hinks there is information content in individual 2’s change in beliefs, so he revises his beliefs in response to the change in
ndividual 2’s beliefs. Using functional notation without superscripts, we  have
p1 = f (p2, I1) (B.4a)
p2 = g(p1). (B.4b)
ubstituting (B.4b) into (B.4a), we obtain
p1 = f (g(p1), I1), (B.5)
o that
dp1/dI1 = [∂f/∂I1] 1
1 −
[
∂f
∂p2
] [ dg
dp1
] (B.6)
he right-hand side is the product of two factors: the partial derivative with respect to information (the direct effect) and
he social multiplier, which is the extent to which a new piece of information is ampliﬁed within the network. (Herding
ehavior can, of course, appear even in models with rational expectations.)
ppendix C. An equilibrium ﬁction of racial hierarchy in cognitive abilityThis appendix shows how a belief in race and in a racial gap in intelligence can produce a racial gap in cognitive perfor-
ance. It draws on three features of how the mind works: we think in terms of categories given to us by society, we have
onﬁrmatory bias, and conﬁdence improves our performance (see Hoff and Stiglitz, 2010 and the evidence in Smith et al.,
008 and Mobius et al., 2014).
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Assume that individuals undertake a series of projects, at each of which they can fail or succeed. Conﬁdence, based on
the person’s perception of his frequency of success, affects the probability of success in future attempts. The top panel of
Fig. C1 shows the relationship. If the individual’s perceptions of his successes and failures were unbiased, there would be a
unique equilibrium at the point marked E, where the 45 degree line intersects the probability-of-success curve. At point E,
the perceived success probability is equal to the actual success probability.
However, this is not an equilibrium if an individual manages his self-image by “forgetting,” or rationalizing as uninforma-
tive of future success, a given fraction of his failures. Frequencies of success are random variables. But in the long run, a true
frequency of success will translate into a perceived frequency of success whose distribution is concentrated around a single
value (Compte and Postlewaite, 2004). The relationship between the true and the perceived mean frequency of success is a
bowed-out curve. (It corresponds to the truth if there are only failures or only successes—hence the bowed-out shape from
the 45 degree line.) The larger the fraction of failures that are forgotten, the more the curve is bowed out.
Consider two types of people and call them Solid and Dashed. They have the same ability, but process information
differently: Solids are better able than Dasheds to forget their own failures. The middle panel graphs the self-conﬁdence
curve of Solid as the more bowed-out curve than that of Dashed.
The bottom panel superimposes the probability of success curve on the self-conﬁdence curves. The difference between
Solid and Dashed in the way they process information generates a different level of self-conﬁdence and hence of performance
for each group—S for Solids and D for Dashed.
Now reinterpret the model by introducing a social element—race. Suppose that the Solid and Dashed types are exactly
the same, except there is a social construct that deﬁnes two “races,” Solid and Dashed. The races are salient—a Solid sees
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imself as Solid, a Dashed as Dashed. The Dashed are deﬁned as the inferior race, which affects how they process information
bout themselves. Compared to a Solid, a Dashed cannot as easily forget or explain away his failures because he sees them
s conﬁrming his alleged inferiority.
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